Toward a Public Enforcement Model for Directors\u27 Duty of Oversight by Jones, Renee M. & Welsh, Michelle
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
3-1-2012
Toward a Public Enforcement Model for Directors'
Duty of Oversight
Renee M. Jones
Boston College Law School, renee.jones.2@bc.edu
Michelle Welsh
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Renee M. Jones and Michelle Welsh. "Toward a Public Enforcement Model for Directors' Duty of Oversight." Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law 45, no.2 (2012): 343-403.
343 
V a n d e r b i l t  J o u r n a l   
       o f  T r a n s n a t i o n a l  L a w  
 
 
VOLUME 45 MARCH 2012 NUMBER 2 
 
 
Toward a Public Enforcement 
Model for Directors’ Duty of 
Oversight 
 
Renee M. Jones* 
Michelle Welsh** 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This Article proposes a public enforcement model for the 
fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Under the dominant 
model of corporate governance, the principal function of the 
board of directors is to oversee the conduct of senior corporate 
officials. When directors fail to provide proper oversight, the 
consequences can be severe for shareholders, creditors, 
employees, and society at large.  
 Despite general agreement on the importance of director 
oversight, courts have yet to develop a coherent doctrine 
governing director liability for the breach of oversight duties. In 
Delaware, the dominant state for U.S. corporate law, the courts 
tout the importance of board oversight in dicta, yet emphasize in 
holdings that directors cannot be personally liable for oversight 
failures, absent evidence that they intentionally violated their 
duties.  
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 We argue that some form of external enforcement 
mechanism is necessary to ensure optimal conduct from 
corporate leaders. Unfortunately, the disciplinary force of 
shareholder litigation has been vitiated by procedural rules and 
doctrines that make it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to 
prevail in derivative litigation. Because private shareholder 
litigation no longer fulfills its traditional role, the need exists 
for alternative mechanisms for director accountability. 
 We look to Australian corporate law for solutions to the 
problem of enforcing the duty of oversight. Australian corporate 
law encompasses a range of enforcement mechanisms for 
directors’ duties. The Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) has power to sue to enforce directors’ 
statutory duties. ASIC can seek a range of penalties for breach 
of duty, including pecuniary penalties and officer and director 
bars. ASIC has prevailed in a number of high-profile actions 
against directors of public companies in recent years. Despite 
the relative rigor of enforcement in Australia, capable directors 
continue to serve and its economy has thrived.  
 The Article explores several possibilities for incorporating 
public enforcement into the U.S. corporate governance system. 
We consider SEC enforcement of fiduciary duties and 
enforcement by states’ attorneys general. We also consider 
empowering state judges to impose bars on future service, as an 
alternative to tort-based damages awards. Regardless of the 
exact model of public enforcement, the reforms advanced here 
would help provide for greater director accountability and thus 
better motivate directors to perform their duties responsibly. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The precipitous collapse of many of our major financial 
institutions has revealed significant flaws in the U.S. corporate 
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governance regime. Public inquiries into the failure of Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, and Citigroup consistently portray directors as 
oblivious to the scope of the risks their firms had undertaken. 
Directors remained blind to significant departures from approved risk 
management guidelines and failed to detect flaws in financial 
reporting practices that led to systematic underreporting of leverage 
and the concealment of devastating losses. 
 Since the 2008 financial collapse, Congress and financial 
regulators have adopted major reforms designed to prevent the 
recurrence of such calamities. Similarly, in 2002, Congress, the SEC 
and self-regulatory organizations adopted reforms aimed at 
preventing future financial frauds. Despite these major federal 
reform initiatives, a basic corporate governance problem remains 
unresolved. The 2001−2002 corporate governance scandals and the 
2008 financial crisis have laid bare a basic reality. Directors are not 
providing the kind of corporate oversight that forms a fundamental 
tenet of the monitoring model of corporate governance. 
 The director’s role as corporate monitor serves as an article of 
faith among most corporate theorists. Prestigious institutions, from 
the American Law Institute to the Business Roundtable, embrace the 
monitoring model. The monitoring model forms the basis of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms that sought to strengthen the hand of 
independent directors vis-à-vis corporate management. Likewise, 
state judges, who act as principal enforcers of fiduciary duties, 
consistently emphasize the importance of board oversight. In judicial 
opinions and outside commentary, judges urge directors to pay 
attention, stay informed, and act as vigilant monitors of the conduct 
of corporate managers. 
 Despite broad acceptance of the monitoring model, courts have 
yet to develop a coherent doctrine governing director liability for the 
breach of oversight duties. In Delaware, the dominant state for U.S. 
corporate law, courts curiously tout the importance of board oversight 
in dicta, yet emphasize in holdings that directors cannot be 
personally liable for oversight failures, absent evidence that they 
intentionally violated their duties. 1  While setting a high bar for 
liability, courts have offered little guidance about the kinds of facts 
that would satisfy this arduous standard. 
 Many commentators defend this laissez-faire approach to 
enforcing directors’ duties.2 They argue that the law should stand 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (affirming that a 
necessary condition for director oversight liability is “intentionally fail[ing] to act in the 
face of a known duty to act”). 
 2. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90–98 (1991) (arguing that market discipline usually 
serves an adequate alternative to director liability for breach of fiduciary duty); 
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and 
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aside to let private forces such as the market and social norms 
promote responsible conduct among corporate officials. These 
commentators maintain that a rigorous liability regime would harm 
shareholder interests by discouraging risk taking and deterring 
qualified directors from serving.3 The risk of unfair hindsight bias, 
litigation costs, and shareholders’ asserted ability to limit their risk 
exposure through portfolio diversification serve as further rationales 
for shielding directors from liability.4 
 Another reason courts refrain from enforcing the duty of 
oversight is that the penalties seem harsh when compared to an 
outside director’s degree of responsibility for the alleged harm.5 To 
avoid reaching what is perceived as an unjust result, courts have too 
often spared directors from any consequence for their failure to 
perform their core function.6 This unwillingness to enforce the duty to 
monitor leaves directors with little guidance on the content of their 
duties, contributing to the kind of board passivity associated with 
recent corporate collapses.  
 When directors fail to provide proper oversight, the consequences 
can be severe for corporations, investors, employees, and society at 
large. Although markets and social factors can influence director 
behavior, some form of external discipline is necessary to ensure optimal 
                                                                                                                      
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2001) (arguing that 
firms exist to replace legal governance with non-legally-enforceable governance 
mechanisms). 
 3. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director 
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1140 (2006) (“[T]he limited out-of-pocket risk that we 
observe may well be sensible from a policy perspective.”); cf. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. 
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[A] demanding test of liability in 
the oversight context is probably beneficial to corporate shareholders as a 
class . . . since it makes board service by qualified persons more likely . . . .”). 
 4. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in 
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992−2004? A Retrospective on Some 
Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1422–35 (2005) (describing the problems of 
encouraging risk aversion and hindsight bias as justifications for deference to director 
decisions). 
 5. See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms and the Breakdown of the Board: 
Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 148–50 (2006) 
(discussing judicial nullification of corporate law rules); see also Donald C. Langevoort, 
Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 663–66 
(1996) (discussing the impact of draconian damages in the context of securities 
litigation). 
 6. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the 
Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. 
REV. 261, 317 (1981) (discussing the “tendency of the law to nullify extreme penalties 
and to distort the substantive law in an effort to avoid punishments that do not fit the 
crime”); Langevoort, supra note 5, at 655 (noting that because directors are poorly 
situated to monitor, large damages awards against outside directors may not provide 
effective deterrence). 
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conduct. The shareholder lawsuit was created to serve this function.7 
Unfortunately, the disciplinary force of shareholder litigation has 
been vitiated by procedural rules and doctrines that make it 
exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in derivative litigation. 
Because private shareholder litigation no longer fulfills its traditional 
role, the need exists for alternative mechanisms for director 
accountability. 
 We look to Australian corporate law for possible solutions to the 
problem of enforcing the duty of oversight. 8  U.S. and Australian 
corporate law both emerge from the “Anglo-American” common law 
tradition. Thus, the United States and Australia share the same basic 
corporate governance structure. Like the United States, Australia has 
a highly developed economy with sophisticated trading markets, 
characterized by dispersed share ownership. 9  In recent decades 
however, Australia has revamped its corporate law system, 
confronting the difficulties that federalism posed to maintaining 
uniform national standards and bolstering mechanisms for enforcing 
the obligations of corporate officers and directors.10 Thus, despite a 
shared legal tradition, enforcement practices in Australia now 
diverge significantly from U.S. custom.11 
                                                                                                                      
 7. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW 442 
(3d ed. 2011) (“Shareholder derivative suits are the principal remedy by which 
defrauded minority shareholders may call directors, officers, promoters and controlling 
shareholders to account for mismanagement, diversion of assets, and fraudulent 
manipulation of corporate affairs.”); Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing 
Authority and Accountability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 
39, 57 (2008) (“Shareholder derivative litigation constitutes the formal method of 
accountability in the corporate context.”). 
 8. We draw a comparative portrait between the United States and Australia 
with a simple and pragmatic purpose. Our goal is to discern possible solutions to a set 
of seemingly intractable problems by studying how a different approach to enforcing 
directors’ duties has fared abroad. We find the Australian comparison fruitful because 
that country has implemented several policies that U.S. commentators often assert 
would have disastrous impact on our economy. Thus, Australia can serve, in a manner, 
as a laboratory for testing some of the strongest arguments invoked in defense of the 
United States’ lax director liability regime. 
 9. Share ownership is more concentrated in Australia than in the United 
States. See Jennifer G. Hill, Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Comparing CEO 
Employment Contract Provisions: Differences Between Australia and the United States, 
64 VAND. L. REV. 559, 561 (2011) (characterizing shareholding ownership in U.S. 
capital markets as dispersed while acknowledging that this is not the case in 
Australia). However, recent studies show that share ownership in both countries is 
more concentrated than commonly believed. Id. at 561 n.7. 
 10. See infra note 148 (discussing the evolution of a national corporate law 
regime in Australia). 
 11. For prior articles that compare directors’ duties and enforcement in the 
United States and Australia, see Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside 
Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007); 
Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
367 (2005) [hereinafter Hill, Regulatory Responses]; Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting 
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 The Australian example matters in part because its financial 
regulatory system has drawn the attention of commentators in the 
United States and throughout the world. Its “twin peaks” approach to 
financial regulation has been held up as a model for global financial 
reform initiatives.12  Under twin peaks, responsibility for financial 
regulation is divided according to regulatory objectives, with a 
systemic risk regulator and a business conduct regulator.13 The twin 
peaks approach figured prominently in former Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson’s “Blueprint” for financial reform and in the Group of 
30’s similar set of recommendations.14 Although the Blueprint and 
the G-30 report recommend that the United States adopt a version of 
the twin peaks model, these proposals pay little heed to important 
differences in the authority of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) when compared with the U.S. 
financial regulators. 
 In Australia, ASIC functions as the business conduct regulator.15 
ASIC has the power to sue to enforce the statutory duties of all 
corporate directors and can seek a range of penalties including 
pecuniary penalties and officer and director bars. In recent years, 
ASIC has prevailed in a number of high-profile actions against 
directors of public companies. Yet, despite the relative rigor of 
Australia’s enforcement system, the parade of horribles that 
commentators insist would follow from imposing liability on outside 
directors has not occurred. In fact, Australia has fared far better than 
                                                                                                                      
Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.’s Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 1 (2010); Cindy A. Schipani, Defining the Corporate Directors’ Duty of Care 
Standard in the United States and Australia, 4 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 152 (1994). 
 12. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS: A REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR THE 
NEW CENTURY 1 (1995) (proposing a financial regulatory structure designed around the 
twin peaks of prudential regulation and investors and consumer protection); John C. 
Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better 
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 715, 782 (2009) (endorsing the “twin peaks” model as part of 
a new financial regulatory structure).  
 13. This contrasts with the functional model in place in the United States 
where regulatory authority is allocated according to business function with multiple 
regulators overseeing various aspects of the operations of large financial 
conglomerates. See GRP. OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: 
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 14–15, 34–35 (2009), 
available at http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%20Structure%20of%20Financial 
%20Supervision.pdf (describing the U.S. approach to financial regulation as functional 
with some aspects of an institutional model). 
 14. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT 
FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 141–50 (2008), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf (discussing 
the benefits of twin peaks’ “objectives based” approach to financial regulation); GRP. OF 
THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 34 (2009), available 
at http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Financial_Reform-A_Framework_for_Financial 
_Stability.pdf (arguing for a variant of the twin peaks approach to financial supervision). 
 15. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(1) 
(Austl.). 
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the United States in the wake of the recent global financial crisis.16 
Unlike the United States, no major Australian banks failed during 
the crisis.17 
 This Article explores several possibilities for implementing 
public enforcement of directors’ duties in the United States. We first 
consider SEC enforcement of fiduciary duties. We then assess 
enforcement by states’ attorneys general. We also consider 
empowering state judges to impose sanctions for oversight breaches, 
such as a bar on future service, as an alternative to tort-based 
damage awards. Although we acknowledge obstacles to adopting a 
public enforcement regime in the United States, the proposed reforms 
are less radical than they may appear at first blush.  
 The SEC already has power to bring enforcement actions against 
directors for conduct that in substance constitutes a breach of fiduciary 
duty. Similarly, state regulators enjoy power to enforce the duties of 
directors of nonprofit corporations.18 Because ample precedent exists 
for public enforcement of fiduciary duties, expanding regulators’ 
authority to enforce the duties of directors of business corporations 
would be a logical extension of existing law and practice.  
 This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II examines the U.S. 
corporate governance system and outlines obstacles to enforcing 
directors’ oversight duties. The Article connects the failure of 
American courts to enforce the duty of oversight with a culture of 
inattention and passivity that seems to pervade the contemporary 
corporate boardroom. Part III addresses the main arguments courts 
and scholars invoke to defend the lax director liability regime. It 
examines the various factors that motivate individuals to comply with 
their legal obligations by surveying existing literature on law 
compliance. It concludes that although social and normative factors 
influence compliance, a need still exists for external accountability 
mechanisms for corporate directors. Part IV provides an overview of 
Australia’s corporate law enforcement regime, focusing on public 
enforcement actions by ASIC. Part V then identifies elements of 
                                                                                                                      
 16. The global financial crisis had less of an impact in Australia than it did in 
many other countries. For example, Australia managed to avoid a recession and the 
current seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate is 5.1 percent. Labour Force, 
Australia, Jul 2011, AUSTL. BUREAU STAT., http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/ 
abs@.nsf/allprimarymainfeatures/8E87BDFA74F2BD55CA2579040013C94D?opendocu
ment (last updated Sept. 11, 2011). 
 17. The reasons that Australia managed to avoid the fallout of the global 
financial crisis lie beyond the scope of this Article. We simply note that Australia has 
experienced greater economic stability than the United States despite maintaining a 
more rigorous corporate regulatory regime. For a discussion of some reasons why 
Australia fared comparatively well in the global financial crisis, see generally 
Elizabeth F. Brown, A Comparison of The Handling of The Financial Crisis in the 
United States, The United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 VILL. L. REV. 509 (2010). 
 18. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 785–86 (8th 
ed. 2009) (discussing attorney general oversight of charities). 
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Australia’s public enforcement system that merit consideration in the 
United States. It highlights the bar on future service as a remedy 
that would enhance the accountability of corporate officials. It also 
explores several possible approaches to adopting such reforms and 
addresses likely obstacles to implementation. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE OVERSIGHT DUTIES IN  
THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Monitoring Model of Corporate Governance 
 In the United States, corporate statutes vest directors with the 
power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. 19 
Because directors have the legal power to direct a corporation’s 
affairs, they also bear the burden of exercising such power 
responsibly. Thus corporate law imposes fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care on directors. In the modern corporation, directors delegate 
their management power to officers who run the day-to-day affairs of 
the corporation. Although such delegation is proper, directors are 
expected to oversee the conduct of senior officers in their execution of 
management functions. Thus, in theory at least, directors remain 
responsible for anything that goes wrong on their watch. 
 Although this delegation of authority is the accepted norm, the 
legal regime still expects directors to do “something.” Exactly what 
this “something” entails can be difficult to discern, as a wide gap 
exists between ideal director conduct expressed by popular “best 
practice” standards, and the minimum level of performance necessary 
to shield directors from liability for a corporation’s losses.20 Although 
the precise steps a director must take to fulfill his duties in any given 
context remains unclear, courts and commentators agree on the 
general contours of a director’s obligations.  
 The most significant obligation of the modern corporate director 
is to oversee the conduct of corporate executives.21 This oversight 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and affairs of 
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.”). 
 20. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 438 (1993) 
(“[S]tandards of review in corporate law pervasively diverge from the standards of 
conduct.”). 
 21. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02 (Revisions to the Proposed Final Draft 1992) (discussing the 
oversight functions and responsibilities of a board of directors); BUS. ROUNDTABLE, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7 (2010), available at 
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/2010_Principles_of_ 
Corporate_Governance_1.pdf (describing the roles of corporate directors and 
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duty is broad, but can be divided into several distinct components. 
First, at a minimum, directors must pay some attention to the 
corporation’s affairs. They must understand the business, review 
financial statements, and attend board meetings.22 Directors should 
participate actively in meetings by reviewing relevant documents and 
asking questions before making important decisions.23 If at any time 
directors sense that something is awry, they must inquire further, 
and consult experts or hire lawyers if necessary.24 
 Courts also expect the board to monitor the corporation’s 
compliance with law. Directors must establish a monitoring system 
designed to prevent, detect, and correct a corporation’s violations of 
law. 25  In addition to monitoring law compliance, directors bear 
responsibility for overseeing the corporation’s financial reporting 
system. Although directors do not prepare or audit financial reports, 
they must oversee the work of the audit firm. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 affirms directors’ obligations in this regard.26 Sarbanes-Oxley 
makes clear that directors must hire the auditors, set their 
compensation and meet regularly with them to discuss the company’s 
most significant financial reporting issues.27 The audit committee of 
the board of directors bears the bulk of this responsibility.28 
 More recently, courts and scholars have begun to focus on 
directors’ responsibility for overseeing corporate risk.29 Although risk 
                                                                                                                      
management); COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
POLICIES ¶ 2.7 (2011), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/council%20policies/ 
CII%20Corp%20Gov% 20Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%2012-21-11%20FINAL.pdf 
(describing the board’s role in risk oversight). 
 22. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821–23 (N.J. 1981); see also 
Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 896–97 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding director liable for failing 
to monitor the actions of bank president, who was also his son); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, 
CORPORATION LAW 280 (2d ed. 2010) (“The vast majority of opinions, however, are 
consistent with Francis in demanding that directors pay some attention to their role.”). 
 23. COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, at 203. 
 24. See Hoye, 795 F.2d at 896 (“Where suspicions are aroused, or should be 
aroused, it is the directors’ duty to make necessary inquiries.”); Francis, 432 A.2d at 
823 (“[T]he fulfillment of the duty of a director may call for more than mere objection 
and resignation. Sometimes a director may be required to seek the advice of counsel.”). 
 25. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 368–69 (Del. 2006) (endorsing and 
applying Caremark’s legal compliance rule); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 
698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that corporate boards must “assur[e] 
themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organization” in order 
to satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed). 
 26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 27. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk 
Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 967–68 (2009) (examining liability of corporate 
directors for failures in risk management during the 2008 financial crisis); Franklin A. 
Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Crisis: Reflections on In 
re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 MCGEORGE PAC. GLOBAL BUS. 
2012] toward a public enforcement model 353 
management does not fall squarely within directors’ traditional 
duties, the financial crisis has highlighted the importance of director 
engagement on this issue.30 Commentators have also taken note of 
how executive compensation schemes seem to promote a short-term 
focus, creating incentives for managers to take unreasonable risks in 
pursuit of short-term gains.31 The prevalence of incentives to engage 
in reckless risk taking increases the need for directors to closely 
monitor operational risk.   
B. Enforcing the Duty to Monitor 
1. The Derivative Suit 
 In theory, a director’s failure to fulfill his fiduciary duty exposes 
him to personal liability for any damages the corporation or its 
shareholders suffer as a result of the breach. The derivative lawsuit 
gives shareholders power to bring a suit in the name of the 
corporation for breach of fiduciary duty. 32  Traditionally, the 
derivative suit has served as the principal mechanism for enforcing 
directors’ duties.33 For a variety of reasons, however, the shareholder 
suit has ceased to function as an effective disciplinary tool. First, a 
range of judicial doctrines, procedural rules, statutory protections, 
and contractual arrangements protect directors from any real risk of 
personal liability.34 In addition, Delaware courts have imposed a low 
substantive standard when assessing director performance. 
                                                                                                                      
& DEV. J. 113, 113–20 (2010) (discussing the role of excessive risk in Citigroup’s near 
collapse); Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at 
Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 54–57 (2010) (reviewing recent literature on 
oversight liability suits); Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A 
Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 225–31 (2011) 
(assessing a board’s duty to monitor business risk).  
 30. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (assessing a Caremark claim against directors for their alleged failures 
to properly monitor the riskiness of subprime mortgage investments). 
 31. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 262−67 (2010) (describing how bankers’ compensation structures 
encourage excessive risk taking); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming 
Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON 
REG. 359, 362–64 (2009) (proposing a requirement that executives retain all equity 
compensation awards until two to four years following termination of employment in 
order to discourage short-term risk taking); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker 
Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1205, 1226–41 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546229 (proposing 
debt-based compensation to discourage short-term risk taking). 
 32. GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 407−08. 
 33. See Scarlett, supra note 7, at 57 (characterizing shareholder derivative 
litigation as the “formal method of accountability in the corporate context”). 
 34. See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 1059–62 (presenting an 
empirical study demonstrating the rarity of out-of-pocket payments by outside 
directors); Lynn A. Stout, On Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t 
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 The business judgment rule offers directors an initial layer of 
protection from personal liability. Under the business judgment rule, 
courts refrain from second-guessing directors’ decisions untainted by 
self-dealing, illegality, waste, or fraud.35 Thus, directors will not be 
held to account for ill-advised decisions, so long as a rational basis for 
the decision can be found. 
 In addition, special procedural rules that apply in derivative 
litigation make it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on their 
claims. The demand requirement mandates that plaintiffs first make 
demand on the board to take corrective action or plead that such a 
demand would be futile.36 In cases where plaintiffs establish demand 
futility, the board of directors can still wrest control of the litigation 
by appointing a special litigation committee to assess the wisdom of 
pursuing the claims. 37  Such committees typically conclude that 
continuing the litigation is not in the corporation’s interest and move to 
dismiss the lawsuit on that basis.38 In general, Delaware courts have 
been deferential to the conclusions of the special litigation committee.39 
However, in several high-profile cases, the courts rejected the special 
committee’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the committee members 
were not sufficiently independent of the directors being sued.40 
 The most significant barrier to director liability for oversight 
failures are exculpatory provisions adopted in every state that 
                                                                                                                      
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (2003) 
(arguing that corporate directors rarely have to pay damages in a breach of duty case). 
 35. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 36. Id. at 814–15. To successfully plead demand futility, plaintiffs must allege 
with particularity facts demonstrating that a majority of the directors had an interest 
in the challenged transaction or that their decision is not otherwise protected by the 
business judgment rule. If the court determines the plaintiffs have not properly pled 
demand futility, their claims will be dismissed. Id. 
 37. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981) (“The 
committee can properly act for the corporation to move to dismiss derivative litigation 
that is believed to be detrimental to the corporation’s best interest.”). 
 38. GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 434 (“Special litigation committees usually 
have concluded that the derivative suits which the committees looked into were not in 
the corporation’s best interest.” (citations omitted)); Jessica Erickson, Corporate 
Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 
1786 (2010) (“By and large, the SLCs in my study recommended dismissal of the 
claims.”); cf. Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation 
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1311 (2009) (“SLCs do not 
uniformly decide to dismiss derivative litigation. They sought some form of formal 
relief much more frequently than heretofore recognized: approximately forty percent of 
the time, SLCs pursued or settled claims against one or more defendants.”). 
 39. GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 454–57 (describing Delaware courts’ approach 
to evaluating recommendations of special litigation committees). 
 40. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 921 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(denying the special litigation committee’s motion to terminate litigation for lack of 
impartiality); Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1165 (Del. Ch. 2003) (concluding that 
the special litigation committee could not meet its burden to prove independence). 
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immunize directors from liability for the breach of the duty of care.41 
In Delaware, for example, § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law allows corporations to eliminate directors’ personal 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty other than breach of the duty of 
loyalty, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of law, improper 
dividends, and acts and omissions “not in good faith.”42 Although the 
interpretation of the term “good faith” has attracted significant 
scholarly attention, recent Delaware cases make clear that liability 
for oversight failures will not lie, absent a director’s intentional 
dereliction of duty.43 
 Additional contractual arrangements further insulate directors 
from any negative consequence of their oversight failures. Under 
standard indemnification provisions, corporations pay all costs 
associated with defending suits brought against directors in their 
official capacity. 44  Any judgments and settlements that cannot 
lawfully be indemnified can be covered by director and officer liability 
policies purchased by the corporation. 45  Although indemnification 
and insurance provisions limit payments in certain circumstances, 
most cases are settled in a manner that ensures that such exclusions 
are never triggered.46  
                                                                                                                      
 41. See Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability 
Within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 218–19 (2010) (describing 
the prevalence and operation of statutory exculpation provisions). 
 42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). Section 102(b)(7) authorizes 
inclusion in the corporate charter of:  
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary 
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the 
liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the 
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under 
§ 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an 
improper personal benefit. 
Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (stating that a 
necessary condition for director oversight liability is “intentionally fail[ing] to act in the 
face of a known duty to act”). 
 44. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2011) (“A corporation shall have 
power to indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a 
party to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding . . . by reason 
of the fact that the person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the 
corporation . . . .”); see also Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 1083–84 
(noting that under Delaware law corporations may indemnify directors for damages, 
settlements and legal expenses as long as the director acted in good faith). 
 45. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (allowing Delaware corporations to 
purchase D&O insurance); Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 1085 (noting 
that almost all companies provide insurance for their officers and directors that cover 
legal expenses, damages, and settlements). 
 46. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 
49 (2010) (observing that the vast majority of shareholder claims settle without final 
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2. Oversight Duties and Good Faith  
 Due to the prevalence of exculpatory provisions in corporate 
charters, a director’s failure to provide proper oversight will not 
result in personal liability under Delaware law unless the plaintiff 
can show that a director failed to act in good faith.47 Delaware courts’ 
interpretation of the term “good faith” has thus become the 
determinative factor for the viability of an enforceable duty of 
oversight. The phrase “good faith” is nowhere defined in the 
Delaware’s corporate statute and courts have struggled to impart 
meaning to the term. 
 At one point, it appeared that a failure to act in good faith might 
include conduct that could be classified as “especially” gross 
negligence—conduct that was not a classic breach of the duty of 
loyalty but was culpable enough to merit legal sanction.48 Delaware 
courts later clarified that they will not impose liability for 
inattentiveness or gross negligence unless plaintiffs can prove “bad 
faith” by showing that directors intentionally violated their duties.49 
Thus, under emerging good faith doctrine, even mechanistic efforts by 
boards to review monitoring systems can create a virtually 
impenetrable shield from liability, with little regard to the actual 
effectiveness of such systems. 
 The Caremark line of cases demonstrates the courts’ effort to 
promote board oversight while at the same time declining to hold 
directors personally accountable for lapses in oversight. 50  In re 
                                                                                                                      
adjudication and that plaintiffs craft pleadings to avoid allegations of intentional fraud 
to avoid triggering policy exclusions). 
 47. Section 102(b)(7) can be invoked as an affirmative defense at a motion to 
dismiss. To survive the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must plead “with particularity” 
facts showing that directors acted in bad faith—that they acted with intent to harm the 
corporation or knowingly and intentionally breached their duties. See In re Citigroup 
Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 135 (Del. Ch. 2009) (dismissing claims for 
failure to sufficiently plead facts that could support a finding that the directors acted or 
made material omissions in bad faith). Of course, it is not sufficient to simply plead 
“the directors knew they were breaching their duties.” Instead, the plaintiff must allege 
facts that shed light on the directors’ state of mind. This must be done without the 
benefit of discovery, which might allow plaintiffs to unearth documents that reveal the 
directors’ state of mind or otherwise create a reasonable suspicion that the directors 
acted in bad faith. 
 48. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric 
in Corporate Law Jurisprudence,  55 DUKE L.J. 1, 4−6 (2005) (noting that recent cases 
treat good faith as an “independent basis for decision” rather than merely a shorthand 
for duty of care); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 464 
(2004) (“As a separate duty, good faith can attach to situations beyond those invoking 
loyalty concerns . . . .”). 
 49. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[A] showing of bad 
faith . . . is essential to establish director oversight liability . . . .”). 
 50. See Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark and Stone: 
Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 339–42 (J. Mark 
Ramseyer ed., 2009) (describing Chancellor William Allen’s hope that, despite the 
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Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation 51  presents the 
modern formulation of a director’s oversight duties by rejecting as 
outdated the Delaware Supreme Court’s earlier pronouncement in 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers.52 In Caremark, the court asserted that 
directors have a duty to ensure that a monitoring system exists that 
is capable of providing directors with “timely, accurate information 
sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, 
to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s 
compliance with law and its business performance.”53  
 Caremark’s assertion of the existence of a duty to monitor was 
mere dicta, as the judge was considering a motion to approve a 
settlement. While touting the importance of director oversight duties, 
the court concluded that no breach of duty had likely occurred, as the 
board had adopted a compliance program that nonetheless failed to 
prevent the legal violations.54 Indeed, the directors were aware of the 
conduct that was the basis for federal sanctions. However, Chancellor 
Allen concluded that, because lawyers had advised the board that the 
practices in question were “contestable, [but] lawful,” the board had 
likely fulfilled its duty to monitor.55 
 Under Caremark, a board’s failure to create a monitoring system 
would constitute a breach of the duty of care, and as an unconsidered 
failure to act, would not be protected by the business judgment rule.56 
However, Caremark also provides that once a monitoring system is in 
place, the board’s decisions as to the scope and adequacy of the 
system are business decisions that lie beyond judicial scrutiny, save 
for certain exceptions to the business judgment rule.57 Thus, under 
Caremark, once a corporation has put a compliance system in place, 
courts will not hold directors responsible for damages even if the 
monitoring system fails.58 Although Caremark was framed as a duty 
of care decision, the court invoked good faith as the standard by 
which to assess the board’s process in adopting the monitoring 
                                                                                                                      
narrow standard of review it endorsed, his Caremark opinion “would alter directors’ 
behavior through its moral suasion and associated impact on directors’ norms”). 
 51. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 52. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (holding 
that directors had no duty to “ferret out wrongdoing” and would not be liable for a 
corporation’s violation of law unless they knew or should have known about the 
violations). 
 53. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 54. Id. at 971–72. 
 55. Id. at 971. 
 56. Id. at 968–70. 
 57. Id. at 970. 
 58. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370–73 (Del. 2006) (indicating that as 
long as the reporting system is reasonable, a board will not have to monitor every 
decision by its officers); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (acknowledging that even good faith 
information and reporting systems sometimes will fail to reveal problems). 
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system.59 Because a director’s “acts or omissions not in good faith” are 
beyond the protection of an exculpatory provision, Caremark allowed 
for a theoretical risk of personal liability. 
 Years after the Caremark ruling, a series of decisions in the 
Disney litigation created uncertainty regarding whether a director’s 
gross inattention to business matters could result in personal liability 
as a failure to act in good faith.60 In 2003, the Delaware Chancery 
Court surprised observers when it denied a motion to dismiss a claim 
against Disney’s directors for approving Disney president Michael 
Ovitz’s employment agreement with its lucrative termination 
provisions.61 The court concluded that the plaintiffs adequately pled 
that the directors failed to act in good faith by alleging that they paid 
insufficient attention to an important business matter, “adopting a 
‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a material 
corporate decision.”62 
 The 2003 Disney decision caused a stir, as the legal community 
had long presumed that § 102(b)(7) protected directors from personal 
liability for any lapses other than the breach of the duty of loyalty. In 
Stone v. Ritter however, the Delaware Supreme Court quelled any 
lingering fears among directors that the Disney decisions had raised. 
In Stone, the court announced that the duty to act in good faith was 
not an independent duty, but was instead a subset of the duty of 
loyalty.63 The court ruled that oversight failures that amounted to the 
breach of the duty of good faith were nonexculpable breaches of the 
duty of loyalty. 64  However, the court also reiterated Caremark’s 
admonition that it would be extremely difficult for plaintiffs to 
succeed on such a claim.65 
 Thus under Stone, to prevail on an oversight claim, plaintiffs 
must show that directors failed to act in the face of a known duty to 
act, by demonstrating the board’s “utter failure” to implement a 
monitoring and reporting system or a conscious failure to monitor or 
oversee the operation of such a system.66 As put succinctly in Stone, 
plaintiffs must show not only that oversight failures led to corporate 
                                                                                                                      
 59. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (emphasizing a director’s obligation to 
“exercise a good faith judgment” that the corporation’s information and reporting 
system is adequate). 
 60. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 
(Del. Ch. 2005); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 61. Disney, 825 A.2d at 275. 
 62. Id. at 289. 
 63. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 372 (noting with approval the description of an oversight claim in 
Caremark as “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a 
plaintiff might hope to win a judgment”); Pan, supra note 29, at 232–33 (describing the 
practical difficulties of successfully arguing a failure to monitor claim). 
 66. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
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losses, but that the directors knew that they were breaching their 
duties and simply did not care.67 Despite arguably raising the bar for 
pleading a duty to monitor claim, the Delaware courts have offered 
little guidance as to how plaintiffs might successfully plead the 
required facts regarding the directors’ state of mind.68 
 The Court of Chancery’s more recent decision in In re Citigroup 
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation underscores the challenges 
plaintiffs face in seeking to recover for directors’ oversight failures.69 
In Citigroup, the plaintiffs alleged that Citigroup’s directors failed to 
adequately monitor financial risks that brought the company to the 
brink of collapse. 70  The Court of Chancery dismissed the claim, 
concluding that because Citigroup had established an audit and risk 
management committee that met multiple times per year and was 
charged with monitoring corporate risk, the plaintiffs’ oversight claim 
must fail.71 The court declined to inquire as to whether the committee 
did anything useful, or whether despite the monitoring system, 
enough facts had come to the directors’ attention to alert them that 
risk management policies needed to be adjusted.72 Instead, the court 
concluded that despite the ostensible duty of oversight, Citigroup’s 
directors were not responsible for the company’s spectacular 
collapse.73 
C. The Economic Consequences of Oversight Failures 
 The need for an effective accountability mechanism for oversight 
responsibilities becomes stark when one considers the serious 
consequences that often flow from oversight failures. Many would 
argue that Citigroup’s near collapse is an instance in which the 
absence of effective oversight led to catastrophic consequences for the 
firm, its investors, and the nation.74  
 As one of the world’s largest financial conglomerates, Citigroup 
was highly profitable during the early and mid-2000s, reporting 
profits of about $24 billion and $21 billion in 2005 and 2006 
                                                                                                                      
 67. See id. (“[I]mposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew 
that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”). 
 68. Pan, supra note 29, at 211. 
 69. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 70. Id. at 111–12. 
 71. See id. at 128. 
 72. See Bainbridge, supra note 29, at 986 (describing the demands imposed on 
the board in Citigroup as “strikingly modest” and noting that “[t]he court did not drill 
down into the details of what the audit committee actually did with respect to risk 
management”). 
 73. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 131 (“Oversight duties under Delaware law are not 
designed to subject directors, even expert directors, to personal liability for failure to 
predict the future and to properly evaluate business risk.”).  
 74. GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 236–37 (noting the financial bailouts as an 
example of the societal impact of corporate failures). 
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respectively.75 Its apparent success began to unravel in October 2007 
when it suddenly announced the write-down of $5.9 billion in 
assets.76 Within a year, losses had mounted to more than $65 billion, 
half of which were attributed to investments in mortgage-backed 
securities.77 In the fall of 2008, Citigroup became the fourth major 
financial firm to require government rescue.78 
 A surfeit of evidence unearthed by journalists and government 
investigators suggests that Citigroup’s directors and senior managers 
actively encouraged a high-risk strategy that included massive 
investments in subprime assets, including collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs).79 After urging this embrace of risk, the directors 
                                                                                                                      
 75. CITIGROUP ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/ar06c_en.pdf?ieNocache=702. 
 76. Eric Dash, Banks Admit Loan Losses; Stocks Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2007, at A1. 
 77. Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 23, 2008, at A1. Other Wall Street firms experienced similar problems as the 
subprime mortgage market continued to falter. Merrill Lynch wrote off $8.4 billion in 
late October 2007 and fired its CEO, Stanley O’Neal. Eric Dash, The Price of Any 
Departure Will Be at Least $159 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at A12. In March 
2008, Bear Stearns was sold in a fire sale to JP Morgan Chase. Jenny Anderson, 
Aftershocks of a Collapse, with a Bank at the Epicenter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at 
C1. Mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the government 
in September 2008, and other major banks, including Washington Mutual and 
IndyMac, failed or were rescued during the period. The crisis finally came to a head in 
September 2008 when Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch was 
rescued by Bank of America’s acquisition. Eric Dash, 5 Days of Pressure, Fear and 
Ultimately, Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A1; Eric Dash, Purchase of Merrill 
Fulfills Quest for a Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A18; Louise Story, Regulators 
Seize IndyMac After a Run on the Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at C5; Eric Dash & 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 25, 2008 at A1. 
 On September 18, after rescuing insurance giant AIG, Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson asked Congress for authority to spend up to $700 billion to purchase toxic 
assets from weakened financial firms. Congress passed the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (known informally as Troubled Asset Relief Program or TARP) on 
October 3, 2008. Mark Landler & Edmund L. Andrews, For Treasury Department, Now 
Comes Hard Part of Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1. On October 13, Citigroup 
received $25 billion in initial TARP funds. However, by November, the firm was still 
struggling, leading to a second round of TARP assistance in the form of a $20 billion 
preferred stock purchase along with a federal guarantee of $306 billion of assets on the 
firm’s balance sheet. David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2008, at A1. 
 78. Eric Dash, U.S. Approves Plan to Help Citigroup Weather Losses, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at A1. 
 79. Dash & Creswell, supra note 77, at A1. Citigroup had embarked on this 
high-octane strategy at the urging of Robert Rubin, chairman of the executive 
committee of the board of directors, who counseled CEO Charles Prince to embrace risk 
to enable the firm to match the performance of competitors such as Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley. Id. 
2012] toward a public enforcement model 361 
failed to adequately monitor the implementation of the strategy.80 
Further, contemporaneous reports from regulators and public and 
private lawsuits had exposed serious weaknesses in Citigroup’s risk 
management practices, internal controls, and ethical standards.81 For 
example, in 2005 the Federal Reserve imposed a moratorium on 
additional acquisitions by Citigroup due to prolonged concerns about 
internal control weaknesses and poor risk management at the firm.82 
Likewise, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency repeatedly 
expressed concerns over Citigroup’s lax risk management. 83  In 
addition, from 2001 through 2005, Citigroup paid billions of dollars to 
settle regulatory and private actions that highlighted management 
and ethical problems, including participation in the Enron frauds, 
financial analyst fraud, mortgage origination fraud, and more.84 
 Compounding the board’s monitoring lapses, Citigroup’s 
directors failed to react as evidence of weakness in real estate and 
subprime came to the fore. Instead, the firm continued its high-risk 
strategy focused on CDOs and securitizations, and in fact moved to 
enhance its exposure in that sector. 85  As the real estate market 
softened, Citigroup ramped up its subprime mortgage operations, 
churning out mortgage backed securities and CDOs without properly 
monitoring its exposure.86 Reportedly, CEO Charles Prince did not 
become aware of the full extent of the firm’s subprime exposure until 
September 2007 when it was too late for the firm to recover.87 
 These kinds of observations formed the gravamen of the 
plaintiffs’ complaint in Citigroup, which the chancery court gave 
short shrift. Because Citigroup had established an audit and risk 
management committee, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could 
not demonstrate the “utter failure” to implement a monitoring system 
that Caremark and Stone require.88 As to Caremark’s second prong of 
failing to heed red flags, the plaintiffs’ efforts also faltered. 89 
                                                                                                                      
 80. See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N [FCIC], THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT 137–39 (2011), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf 
(showing that the Citigroup CDO group did not adequately assess risk). 
 81. For example, Citigroup paid $2.65 billion to settle investor securities fraud 
claims in connection with the WorldCom failure. It also paid $2 billion to settle Enron 
investors’ claims. In addition, the firm paid $400 million to settle federal and state 
claims in connection with analyst fraud and to settle regulators’ mortgage fraud claims. 
See id. at 59–60, 137. 
 82. Id. at 137; see also Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 118−19 (stating that the 
failure Citigroup’s internal risk controls contributed to the company’s downfall). 
 83. FCIC, supra note 80, at 137, 198–99.  
 84. Id. at 60, 92, 137.  
 85. Id. at 195–99; Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 118–19. 
 86. Dash & Creswell, supra note 77, at A1. 
 87. Id. 
 88. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 137 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
 89. Id. at 115, 124. 
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Although the plaintiffs pointed to a number of events and reports 
that should have alerted directors to looming problems, the court 
rejected their claim. Instead, the court concluded that the red flags 
cited were too broad and exogenous to Citigroup to put the board on 
notice of problems occurring at the firm.90 
 The court’s analysis in Citigroup glosses over the fact that 
corporate law and best practice standards require directors to pay 
attention to corporate affairs and industry trends in addition to 
understanding the company’s financial statements.91 Thus, legitimate 
questions linger regarding Citigroup’s directors’ failure to respond to 
alarming news of softness in the real estate market, mounting 
mortgage losses at other banks, and the rapid deterioration in the 
value of its subprime assets.92 An additional concern is whether the 
directors were aware of the scope of Citigroup’s subprime exposure, 
and if not, why not. Such questions go to the heart of directors’ 
oversight responsibilities, but the Delaware court spared the directors 
of any requirement to address these questions when it dismissed 
plaintiffs’ claims.93 
                                                                                                                      
 90. Id. at 128 (“The ‘red flags’ in the complaint amount to little more than 
portions of public documents that reflected the worsening conditions in the subprime 
mortgage market and in the economy generally.”). 
 91. See Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 896–97 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding a director 
liable for breach of the duty of care for failing to monitor investment decisions, 
delegating too much authority, and failing to respond to the company’s increasing 
exposure to risk); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826 (N.J. 1981) 
(holding that a director’s obligations include “reading and understanding financial 
statements, and making reasonable attempts at detection and prevention of the illegal 
conduct of other officers and directors”).  
 92. It is especially telling that soon after the cataclysmic events of 2007, 
Citigroup began to search for new directors with “expertise in finance and 
investments.” Citigroup Director Search, CITIGROUP INC., http://www.citigroup.com/citi/ 
corporategovernance/directorsearch.htm. (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
 93. A federal court assessing the culpability of Citigroup officials for financial 
disclosure violations reached different conclusions regarding certain Citigroup officials’ 
responsibility for investors’ losses. In In re Citigroup Inc. Securities Litigation, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
allowed several securities fraud claims against Citigroup and certain of its directors 
and officers to proceed. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had pled facts adequate 
to create a strong inference that directors Charles Prince and Robert Rubin acted with 
scienter in failing to disclose the extent of the company’s subprime risk exposure. Id. at 
237–38. Although Charles Prince was an insider, as a nonexecutive chairman, Robert 
Rubin was considered an outside director of Citigroup. Id. at 239. 
 The issues in the Citigroup securities litigation differed from the matter before the 
court in Delaware. However, in common was the question of scienter—defendants’ 
knowledge with respect to material facts. In contrast to the Delaware decision, the 
federal district court concluded that plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to create a 
“strong inference” that the Citigroup defendants knew of the extent of Citigroup’s 
subprime risks yet failed to disclose those risks to investors. In re Citigroup, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d at 237. 
 Similarly, in In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Derivative Litigation, 554 F. Supp. 
2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2008), a district court in California excused demand for state-based 
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 The point is not to argue that Citigroup’s directors breached 
their oversight duties and should be held liable for their failures, but 
rather that by dismissing the complaint, the Delaware Chancery 
Court precluded reaching a conclusion on the matter. The dismissal 
on procedural grounds spared directors of the need to explain or 
justify their actions or inaction. Because of Delaware’s hands-off 
approach to oversight liability, cases like Citigroup are rarely 
adjudicated and corporate directors are deprived of meaningful 
guidance about what their duties entail.94  
III. ASSESSING DEFENSES OF THE LAX DIRECTOR LIABILITY REGIME 
A. Common Defenses of Delaware’s Lax Liability Regime  
 Many corporate scholars have expressed concern about the 
absence of personal accountability in the U.S. corporate governance 
regime. Professor Geoffrey Miller recently labeled Delaware’s 
fiduciary duty of care “broken” and called for judicial reforms that 
would provide more meaningful guidance to directors regarding their 
duties.95 Similarly, Professor Donald Langevoort has lamented the 
fact that corporate executives rarely contribute personally to 
shareholder settlements despite the large fortunes they often amass 
at the corporate helm.96 Other scholars have raised similar concerns, 
calling both for increased clarity from courts on the contours of 
directors’ duties and a willingness to impose liability in appropriate 
cases.97  
                                                                                                                      
oversight claims against Countrywide directors, in which plaintiffs alleged the 
directors failed to monitor the bank’s exposure to the subprime market and failed to 
respond to the sustained derogation of mortgage underwriting standards at the bank. 
For a further discussion of the Countrywide decision, see Pan, supra note 29, at 235–
37. 
 94. See Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Fixing Delaware’s Broken 
Duty of Care, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 319, 329 (2010) (arguing that the lack of 
“realistic” opportunities for attorneys’ fees and the likelihood of settlement prevents 
judges from offering opinions about the quality of management’s decision-making 
processes, and there are, consequently, few cases and very little commentary).  
 95. See Miller, supra note 94, at 320 (“Delaware’s duty of care is broken. 
Although the state purports to police against gross negligence by corporate directors, it 
does nothing of the sort . . . . Worse, the fantasy that Delaware monitors director 
performance creates an unhealthy misconception that someone is minding the store.”). 
 96. Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless 
and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity 
Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (2007) (arguing that 
executives responsible for corporate fraud should forfeit the wealth they obtained “as a 
result of their control over the firm during the time of the wrongdoing”). 
 97. See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Normative Justifications for Lax (or 
No) Corporate Fiduciary Duties: A Tale of Problematic Principles, Imagined Facts and 
Inefficient Outcomes, 99 KY. L.J. 231, 233 (2010) (arguing for a robust fiduciary 
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 Although some scholars have criticized Delaware’s “good faith” 
jurisprudence,98 the dominant position among U.S. corporate scholars 
is to defend the Delaware approach. Professors Brian Cheffins and 
Bernard Black provide an apt statement of the position: 
[W]e suggest that the existing pattern of [minimal] liability risk could 
reflect sensible public policy. Reputational concerns can motivate 
outside directors to be vigilant even when they have little fear of ending 
up out of pocket in a lawsuit. Moreover, substantial liability risk could 
have negative corporate governance consequences. Capable people, 
fearing financial ruin, might decline directorships; boards could spend 
too much time on the wrong things; and boardroom decision-making 
could become counterproductively cautious.99 
Professors Cheffins and Black’s assertions echo a common refrain 
often repeated to defend Delaware’s lax approach to enforcing 
fiduciary duties. Examples of such reasoning are evident in 
Chancellor Allen’s landmark Caremark decision. In Caremark, 
Chancellor Allen asserted that there are “good policy reasons why it 
is so difficult to charge directors with responsibility for corporate 
losses for an alleged breach of care, where there is no conflict of 
interest or no facts suggesting suspect motivation involved.” 100  A 
more vigorous director liability regime, he claimed, would harm 
shareholders because “directors will tend to deviate from [the] 
rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation 
to undertake a risky investment, the directors must assume some 
degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto claims of derivative 
liability for any resulting corporate loss.”101  
 Other corporate scholars maintain that liability for breach of the 
duty of care is unnecessary because extralegal forces such as social 
norms provide adequate constraints on board misconduct.102  Such 
                                                                                                                      
standard for corporate managers); Lisa A. Fairfax, Spare the Rod and Spoil the 
Director? Revitalizing Directors Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. 
REV. 393, 395 (2005) (“Legal liability represents an essential mechanism for ensuring 
directors’ fidelity to their fiduciary duties.”); Jones, supra note 5, at 145–46 (calling on 
judges to impose penalties for breaches of fiduciary duty in appropriate cases); 
Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Director Inattention and Director Protection under Delaware 
General Corporation Law Section 102(b)(7): A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 33 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 695, 697 (2008) (asserting that “the threat of punishment via personal 
liability exposure” has potential to be a powerful tool to combat director inattention). 
 98. See Nees, supra note 41, at 204–206 (criticizing Delaware doctrine on 
oversight liability); Pan, supra note 29, at 211 (same). 
 99. Cheffins & Black, supra note 11, at 1389. 
 100. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
 101. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 102. These arguments can be traced back to the so-called New Chicago School. 
Members of the New Chicago School sought to identify mechanisms that would allow 
the government to exploit the power of norms to elicit or reinforce desirable social 
conduct. They reasoned that if one could employ laws to manipulate social norms, there 
would be less need for direct legal commands or state imposed sanctions. E.g., Jones, 
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scholars insist that we need not worry that fiduciary duties lack 
formal methods of enforcement, because the conduct of corporate 
officials can be appropriately constrained by social norms.103 These 
theorists focus on two mechanisms by which a permissive corporate 
law regime might still motivate desirable director conduct. First, 
some speculate that when judges articulate aspirational standards 
even while declining to impose penalties for a breach, they appeal to 
directors’ internal motivations to be “good directors.”104 These well-
intentioned directors will be influenced by judicial pronouncements 
regarding suboptimal director conduct even when no legal 
consequences flow from failures in corporate oversight.105 
 Similarly, some commentators suggest that judges can shame 
directors when they criticize their conduct in opinions that ultimately 
conclude no breach of duty occurred. 106  For example, Professor 
Edward Rock has argued,  
A system that relies on public shaming is perfectly suited to [the 
corporate] context[ ]: The cost to the actor—the disdain in the eyes of 
one’s acquaintances, the loss of directorships, the harm to one’s 
reputation—may often be sufficiently great to deter behavior, even 
without anything more.107  
This shame is thought to come from reading judges’ caustic language 
knowing it may be reprinted in the Wall Street Journal or 
memorialized in corporate law casebooks and Lexis and Westlaw 
                                                                                                                      
supra note 5, at 121–23. For a broader summary and critique of corporate law and 
norms theories, see id. at 125–44. 
 103. See, e.g., Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 12 (“If near-zero 
liability risk is optimal, it is in substantial part because other sources of incentives 
already do much to motivate outside directors to do a good job.”); Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate 
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1796–97 (2001) (arguing that directors will usually heed 
fiduciary duties despite the lack of legal incentives to do so); Rock & Wachter, supra 
note 2, at 1670–71 (asserting that corporate governance “works much better” when the 
duty of care is a non-legally-enforceable rule). 
 104. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1103–04 (1997). 
 105. The Delaware Chancery Court’s trial opinion in the Disney litigation 
provides an example of this reasoning. Despite exonerating all of the defendants, 
Chancellor Chandler, and many contemporary commentators, invoked norms-based 
arguments to explain the decision’s potential impact. See In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) 
(“[T]he Opinion may serve as guidance for future officers and directors—not only of The 
Walt Disney Company, but of other Delaware corporations.”); Sandeep Gopalan, Shame 
Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 757, 767 (2007) (suggesting that 
cases like Disney may make directors more conscious of their responsibilities even 
though the case did not hold the director liable); Martha Neil, Disney Case Has No 
Storybook Ending, 4 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, no. 35, 2005, at 5 (stating that the Disney 
decision will lead directors to pay more attention to their duties).  
 106. Rock, supra note 104, at 1103; David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1823–26 (2001). 
 107. Rock, supra note 104, at 1104. 
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databases. 108 There is scant evidence that such shaming actually 
influences director conduct. In fact, the major corporate failures that 
have characterized the past decade suggest otherwise. Yet to some, 
the very possibility that this may occur helps to justify a lax director 
liability regime.109 
B. Law Compliance Literature 
 Norms governance claims figure prominently in the standard 
defenses for lax liability standards in corporate law. Yet, studies on 
the factors that motivate law compliance raise doubts as to whether 
norms alone, without support from law, are sufficient to motivate 
optimal levels of compliance. In 2001, Søren Winter and Peter May 
reviewed many of these studies and concluded that the factors 
motivating compliance fall into three broad categories: normative 
factors, social factors, and calculated factors.110  
 In their framework, a normative motivation toward compliance 
stems from an individual’s “internalized values or moral 
reasoning,”111 and an acceptance of the legitimacy and importance of 
the law.112 An individual’s general moral principles or sense of civic 
duty contribute to a normative willingness to comply with a given 
requirement.113 So too does the individual’s evaluation of the value of 
a given rule or regulation.114 
 External social factors motivating compliance stem from a desire 
to be respected and approved of by others.115 The desire to avoid 
negative publicity associated with an enforcement action116 and the 
consequential shame, guilt,117 and disapproval118 are important social 
                                                                                                                      
 108. Id. at 1103; see also Jonathan A. Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s 
Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2005) (noting that directors 
“do not like to be made the object of public scorn and ridicule”). 
 109. Macey, supra note 109, at 1134. 
 110. Søren C. Winter & Peter J. May, Motivation for Compliance with 
Environmental Regulations, J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 675, 675 (2001). 
 111. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created 
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 993 (2009). 
 112. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25–26 (1990) (discussing the 
role of legitimacy in motivating law compliance); Winter & May, supra note 110, at 
677. 
 113. Winter & May, supra note 110, at 677. 
 114. Id. at 678. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, How Much Does It Hurt? 
How Australian Businesses Think About the Costs and Gains of Compliance and 
Noncompliance with the Trade Practices Act, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 554, 593–94 (2008) 
(demonstrating that the greater the perceived risk of being caught in noncompliance by 
third parties, the higher respondents perceive both the costs and gains of compliance to 
be).  
 117. Feldman & Teichman, supra note 111, at 994. 
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factors motivating compliance.119 Social factors differ from normative 
factors in that those motivated by social factors comply in order to 
gain approval, even when they do not have an internalized 
commitment to the particular requirement.120  However, over time 
those motivated by social factors may internalize these values and 
become normatively committed to compliance.121 
 Calculated factors include the costs of compliance, likelihood of 
detection, and likely penalties. According to classic deterrence theory, 
the likelihood that an actor will comply with a rule can be determined 
by the expected utility of compliance versus noncompliance. 122 
Central to the calculation of the cost and benefits of noncompliance is 
the role of enforcement and deterrence. As Winter and May argue, 
the cost–benefit “calculus is affected by likelihood of detection—and 
by the speed, certainty, and size of the sanction imposed. As such, the 
enforcement regime is, theoretically at least, an important component 
of calculations of expected utility.”123 
 The Winter and May framework helps to contextualize the norms 
governance hypothesis, which maintains that market and social 
sanctions are sufficient to deter misconduct and breach of duty by 
corporate officials. The norms governance hypothesis emphasizes the 
force of normative and social factors, but fails to take account of the 
influence of calculated factors. It therefore oversimplifies the 
relationship between law, norms, and the conduct of directors.  
 There are two principal reasons why the norms governance 
hypothesis falls short. First, it fails to take into account that the way 
persons motivated by normative and social factors perceive the law is 
influenced by the vigor with which the law is enforced. Secondly, the 
norms governance hypothesis does not adequately address how to 
manage those directors who are primarily motivated by calculated 
factors, in the absence of a realistic threat of formal sanctions. 
                                                                                                                      
 118. John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of 
Corporate Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 8 (1991). 
 119. Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, To What Extent Do Third 
Parties Influence Business Compliance?, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 309, 329 (2008). A study of 
attitudes toward compliance with Australian Trade Practices Law conducted by Parker 
and Nielsen found that Australian businesses are concerned about how any 
noncompliance may be viewed by various third parties including customers, 
shareholders, employees, and business partners. Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann 
Nielsen, What Do Australian Businesses Really Think of the ACCC, and Does It 
Matter?, 35 FED. L. REV. 187 (2007) (Austl.). While not statistically significant, the 
authors did find some evidence that these concerns may have some positive impact on 
some aspects of compliance. Id. at 234.  
 120. Winter & May, supra note 110, at 678. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 676. 
 123. Id. 
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1. Flaws in the Norms Governance Hypothesis for Those Motivated 
by Normative and Social Factors 
 As one of us has previously argued, the disciplinary power of 
norms alone cannot adequately regulate the behavior of corporate 
officials.124 A normative motivation toward compliance stems from an 
individual’s “internalized values or moral reasoning” 125  and an 
acceptance of the legitimacy and importance of the law.126  
 Perceptions of the law’s legitimacy and import are shaped in part 
by enforcement practices. An individual’s understanding of his or her 
moral obligations will be influenced by both the vigor with which the 
law is enforced, and the severity of sanctions that are imposed.127 If 
the law is not enforced or penalties are negligible, observers will 
likely conclude that the standard does not really matter, and the 
failure to satisfy the standard becomes unproblematic from either a 
moral perspective or out of concern for reputation.128 
 Despite the important social message that enforcement policies 
convey, law and norms scholars maintain that the desire to avoid 
negative emotions or bad publicity associated with a corporate failure 
or disastrous decision can help motivate corporate officials to attend 
diligently to their duties, even though a breach will not likely result 
in formal sanctions.129 This argument overlooks the reality that the 
impact of social factors will wane in situations where enforcement 
practices are lax, or where penalties for breach of duty are minimal. 
Thus, the risk exists that without external accountability 
mechanisms, certain undesirable conduct will become more 
commonplace and therefore more widely tolerated. In this way, 
acceptable norms of board conduct may be replaced over time with 
unacceptable norms.130  
  
                                                                                                                      
 124. Jones, supra note 5, at 127. 
 125. Feldman & Teichman, supra note 111, at 993. 
 126. Winter and May, supra note 110, at 677. 
 127. Jones, supra note 5, at 130. 
 128. See Fairfax, supra note 97, at 428–32 (noting the failure of reputational 
concerns to appropriately motivate Enron’s directors); Miller, supra note 94, at 328–29 
(noting the failure of Delaware’s judicial decisions to deliver clear moral messages). 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 102–09.  
 130. Examples include mutual fund market timing, options backdating, 
subprime lending abuses, and other forms of fraud that directors and corporate officers 
readily overlooked, which soon became common practices in the affected industries. See 
Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities 
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 108, 117–19 (2004). 
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2. Flaws in the Norms Governance Hypothesis for Those Motivated 
by Calculated Factors 
 Even if normative and social factors do carry the disciplinary 
force that its proponents ascribe to them, not every corporate actor 
will be sufficiently motivated by normative and social factors. Some 
corporate actors are influenced more by calculated factors, and will 
disregard legal standards when the benefits of noncompliance 
outweigh the perceived costs. The norms governance hypothesis fails 
to grapple adequately with the problem of the recalcitrant actor.  
 For corporate officers and directors, the benefits of lax oversight 
may include the relatively minor benefit of the time saved as a 
consequence of inaction. For some directors passivity and silence may 
be the perceived price for maintaining one’s board position and its 
attendant benefits. Other perceived benefits of lax monitoring may 
include financial and other benefits that flow to the corporations and 
indirectly to individual officers and directors as a result of a failure to 
comply with legal or regulatory requirements. In reality, even a 
minor benefit may be enough to induce noncompliance if the 
perceived costs of noncompliance are sufficiently low. 
 A functioning accountability system matters most for those who 
are motivated principally by calculated factors. For a person 
motivated by calculated factors, increasing the likelihood of 
enforcement can increase one’s commitment to compliance. 131  A 
pessimistic view of human nature lies at the center of deterrent-based 
strategies.132 Deterrence based strategies rely on the availability of 
some mechanism to hold responsible the person or corporation 
engaged in misconduct.  
3. Multiple Motivating Factors 
Recent scholarship on law compliance suggests that it 
oversimplifies matters to assume that a single motivating factor can 
be ascribed to any individual.133 Instead, such scholarship suggests 
that it is most likely that each person is motivated by multiple factors 
to comply with their duties, and that various motivations come to the 
forefront at different points in time. As Winter and May observe, 
while calculated, normative, and social motivating factors are 
sometimes presented as competing bases of compliance, the three are 
not mutually exclusive.134  
                                                                                                                      
 131. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 (1968) (presenting the deterrence perspective on law compliance). 
 132. SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL CONTROL 94 (2002). 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 110–23. 
 134. Winter & May, supra note 110, at 676. 
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 Other commentators have concluded that the factors motivating 
compliance will vary for different people, and further note that an 
individual’s motivations may shift over time. For example, John 
Braithwaite and Ian Ayres assert that corporate actors will be 
motivated to comply with laws and regulatory requirements by a 
range of factors.135 In their view, some corporate actors may be driven 
to act by a sense of social responsibility or a commitment to ethical 
behavior, whereas others will be driven purely by economic factors.136 
Some will be induced to act by a combination of these and other 
factors.137 In addition, the factors driving the behavior of individuals 
may change over time.138 The norms governance hypothesis ignores 
this dynamic.  
C. Toward an Ideal Enforcement Regime 
 Literature on law compliance demonstrates that regulators 
benefit from having a range of tools to address individuals and 
corporations that are motivated by different factors for compliance.139 
The lesson of these studies is that a successful regulatory regime 
should have at its disposal mechanisms that allow virtuous actors the 
chance to be virtuous and to comply voluntarily with the law. Ideally, 
an effective legal system would marshal the forces of normative and 
social factors to induce compliance with the law in the absence of 
detection. Indeed, society could not function if most citizens did not 
voluntarily comply with the law most of the time. However, a 
successful regime must also include mechanisms to penalize 
violations of the law in order to entice nonresponsive actors to 
comply.140 
                                                                                                                      
 135. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (arguing under responsive 
regulation theory that a regulatory agency will not able to detect and enforce every 
contravention of the law it administers and therefore must have mechanisms at its 
disposal that it can utilize to encourage regulated persons to comply with the law); 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TO PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY 
(1985) (same); George Gilligan et al., Civil Penalties and the Enforcement of Directors’ 
Duties, 22 U.N.S.W. L.J. 417, 426 (1999) (arguing responsive regulation theory 
encourages regulators to utilize the enforcement regimes at their disposal in such a 
way as to “stimulate maximum levels of regulatory compliance”). 
 136. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 135, at 24. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Parker & Nielsen, supra note 119, at 195 (“[R]esponsive 
regulation, responds to the plurality and complexity of the motivations and contextual 
factors that influence compliant and non-compliant behavior by saying that regulators 
should also use multiple enforcement strategies in contextually sensitive ways.”). 
 140. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 135, at 26. Responsive regulation theory 
has been applied in many contexts. See FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: 
BEYOND “PUNISH OR PERSUADE” (1997) (applying theory to an analysis of corporate 
response to deaths at work); Darryl Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime and the 
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 In the absence of concrete consequences for the failure to adhere 
to a legal standard, the standard loses force as a guide for behavior 
for those motivated by normative, social, and calculated factors. As 
the recent corporate debacles suggest, aspirational standards have 
failed to guide directors of many prominent corporations to act as 
vigilant overseers of corporate operations.141 The lax liability regime 
has not in fact induced the responsible conduct that its proponents 
asserted it would.142 It thus appears that the prolonged failure by 
courts to enforce fiduciary standards has contributed to an erosion of 
conduct standards across the corporate landscape. 
 In Australia, courts have been called upon to evaluate the 
conduct of directors of corporations that failed or became embroiled in 
scandal. The Australian courts evaluate director conduct under an 
objective standard. 143  As a result, prominent directors of several 
public corporations in Australia have faced significant civil 
sanctions.144 Yet, contrary to the fears of many U.S. commentators, 
the higher standard of conduct has neither led to a rash of director 
                                                                                                                      
Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001) (applying theory to 
criminal liability); Todd Lochner & Bruce Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement 
of Campaign Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891 (1999) (applying theory to campaign 
finance reform); Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A 
Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 452 (1993) (arguing 
that procedural justice, fairness, or legitimacy of experienced punishment is essential 
to the acknowledgment of shame, which conditions deterrence). 
 141. As with investigative reports into the Enron and WorldCom failures, 
several investigations into the causes of the 2008 financial crisis have concluded that 
the directors, and to some extent, senior managers of failed firms were unaware of the 
extent of risk the firms had incurred, and the firms’ failures to fully disclose these 
risks. For accounts of firms involved in the financial crisis, see In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In 
re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-13555), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/lehmanvol2.pdf; FCIC, supra note 80, 
at xii. For thorough accounts of the WorldCom and Enron failures, respectively, see 
RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF: THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, INC. (2003), available at 
http://law.du.edu/images/uploads/restoring-trust.pdf; SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF 
THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (2002), available at 
http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2002/LAW/02/02/enron.report/powers.report.pdf. 
 142. FCIC, supra note 80, at xxvii−xxviii (“[W]e found dramatic breakdowns of 
corporate governance, profound lapses in regulatory oversight, and near fatal flaws in 
our financial system.”). For partial disavowals by former advocates of market 
regulation, see, for example, The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 18 (2008) 
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd.) (noting that the 
market, alone, cannot provide adequate incentives to protect shareholders); Stephen 
Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, 
at A1 (quoting former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox as noting “[t]he last six months 
have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work”). 
 143. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1) (Austl.). 
 144. For a thorough discussion of judicial review of director conduct in 
Australia, see infra Part IV.C.  
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resignations, nor resulted in any discernible negative impact on the 
Australian economy.145 
 Through public enforcement of corporate law, Australia has 
overcome many of the standard objections voiced in the United States 
to more vigorous enforcement of directors’ duties. The concern with 
discouraging strike suits fades under a public enforcement regime. 
Similarly, judicial hesitation to impose draconian penalties is 
dampened because penalties can be calibrated based on the 
culpability of the defendants. With public enforcement, regulators can 
bring actions in the public interest even absent the prospect of a big 
payoff for lawyers. Finally, public enforcement offers mechanisms 
that can protect investors and the public from future harms that may 
be visited by unfit or inattentive directors, as regulators are able to 
obtain orders disqualifying directors from managing public companies 
upon proof of a breach of the duty of care. 
IV. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN AUSTRALIA 
 The Australian approach to enforcing directors’ duties differs 
significantly from U.S. practice. It has long been accepted in 
Australia that it is appropriate to provide a range of enforcement 
mechanisms for the duties of directors. Australian directors who 
breach their duties may be subject to public enforcement by ASIC in 
addition to private civil enforcement. The Australian statutory 
regime allows ASIC to seek a range of orders including pecuniary 
penalties and officer and directors bans. In recent years, ASIC has 
obtained significant orders against directors of several high-profile 
companies.  
A. The Development of Australia’s Corporate Law Regime 
 Australian corporate law is governed by the 2001 Australian 
Corporations Act (the Corporations Act). 146  ASIC, the national 
                                                                                                                      
 145. See infra Part IV.C.2 (evaluating the impact of enforcement in Australia). 
 146. Corporations Act 2001 (Austl.). Until recently, Australian corporate law 
was state-based as the Australian Constitution does not give the Commonwealth 
Parliament clear power to make law with respect to all companies. The lack of 
uniformity across the states and territories created difficulties, leading to several 
unsuccessful attempts to standardize the law beginning in the 1960s. By the early 
1980s, arrangements were in place which resulted in the same corporate law being 
applied in all Australian states and territories. However, it was not until 2001, when 
each state agreed to refer their constitutional power to the Commonwealth Parliament, 
that a truly national legislative scheme was adopted. For a history of the development 
of Australia company law, see ROBERT AUSTIN & IAN RAMSAY, FORD’S PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATIONS LAW (14th ed. 2010); PHILLIP LIPTON, ABE HERZBERG & MICHELLE 
WELSH, UNDERSTANDING COMPANY LAW (15th ed. 2010).  
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corporate regulator, is an independent Commonwealth government 
body charged with regulating “Australian companies, financial 
markets, financial services organizations and professionals who deal 
and advise in investments, superannuation, insurance, deposit taking 
and credit.”147 ASIC has a variety of enforcement mechanisms at its 
disposal, including the civil penalty provisions that are the focus of 
this Article.  
B. The Basic Structure of Australian Corporate Law 
 Directors of Australian corporations are subject to fiduciary and 
statutory duties. The fiduciary duties include the duty of loyalty and 
care and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. The statutory 
directors’ duties require all directors to “exercise their powers and 
discharge their duties with a reasonable degree of care and 
diligence,”148 and to act in the best interests of the corporation and for 
proper purposes.149 All directors, other officers, and employees are 
subject to additional statutory duties not to improperly use their 
position 150  and not to improperly use certain information. 151  The 
statutory duties apply to directors of both public and private 
companies.152 They do not replace the fiduciary duties but operate in 
addition to them.153 
 The duty that most resembles the U.S. duty of oversight is the 
duty of care and diligence. Section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 
states:  
                                                                                                                      
 147. Our Role, AUSTL. SEC & INV. COMMISSION, http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ 
asic.nsf/byheadline/Our+role?openDocument#who (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). For a 
history of corporate regulators in Australia, see Bernard Mees & Ian Ramsay, 
Corporate Regulators in Australia (1961–2000): From Companies Registrars to ASIC, 
22 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 212 (2008). 
 148. Corporations Act 2001 s 180(1) (Austl.). 
 149. Id. s 181(1). 
 150. See id. s 182(1) (“A director, secretary, other officer or employee of a 
corporation must not improperly use their position to: (a) gain an advantage for 
themselves or someone else; or (b) cause detriment to the corporation.”). 
 151. See id. s 183(1) (“A person who obtains information because they are, or 
have been, a director or other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly 
use the information to: (a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or (b) 
cause detriment to the corporation.”). For a discussion of the history of directors’ duties 
in Australia, see Jason Harris, Anil Hargovan & Janet Austin, Shareholder Primacy 
Revisited: Does the Public Interest Have Any Role in Statutory Duties, 26 COMPANY & 
SEC. L.J. 355, 360–61 (2008). 
 152. See Corporations Act 2001 s 9 (defining “director” without distinguishing 
between directors of private and public companies). 
 153. See id. s 185 (“Sections 180 to 184 . . . have effect in addition to, and not in 
derogation of, any rule of law relating to the duty or liability of a person because of 
their office or employment in relation to a corporation.”). For a discussion of the 
relationship between statutory remedies under the Corporations Act and equitable 
remedies, see generally Joachim Dietrich & Thomas Middleton, Statutory Remedies 
and Equitable Remedies, 28 AUSTL. B. REV. 136 (2006). 
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A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers 
and discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a 
reasonable person would exercise if they: (a) were a director or officer of 
a corporation in the corporation’s circumstances; and (b) occupied the 
office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation 
as, the director or officer.154 
This section imposes an objective “reasonable person” standard. The 
standard of care varies according to the type of company, the type of 
office held, and the responsibilities of the individual director. 
However, while the standard may vary, it is clear that the law 
imposes minimum standards of care and diligence on all directors.  
 The duty of care requires directors to “take reasonable steps to 
place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the management 
of a company.”155 Directors are under a continuing obligation to make 
inquiries and keep themselves informed about all aspects of the 
company’s business operations and financial position.156 Directors are 
allowed to make business judgments and take commercial risks, but 
they cannot safely proceed on the basis of ignorance and a failure to 
inquire. They cannot shut their eyes to corporate misconduct.157  
 The duty of care is subject to a business judgment rule contained 
in s 180(2) of the Corporations Act.158 However, directors in Australia 
have rarely invoked the business judgment rule. On the few occasions 
when directors attempted to rely on the business judgment rule, they 
                                                                                                                      
 154. Corporations Act 2001 s 180(1). 
 155. See Daniels v Anderson (1995) 118 FLR 248, 306 (Austl.) (discussing the 
responsibilities of directors).  
 156. See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n v Healey [2011] FCA 717, ¶ 17 (Austl.) 
(listing the responsibilities a director has as including “keep[ing] informed about the 
activities of the corporation”); Vines v Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n (2007) 233 FLR 1, 82 
(Austl.) (emphasizing that the director should have taken steps to be sure he stayed 
informed of relevant matters); Daniels (1995) 118 FLR at 308 (citing Barnes v. 
Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)); Commonwealth Bank of Austl. v Friedrich (1991) 
5 ACSR 115 (Austl.) (“[A] director is expected to be capable of understanding his 
company’s affaires to the extent of actually reaching a reasonably informed opinion of 
its financial capacity.”). 
 157. Daniels (1995) 118 FLR at 309. 
 158. See Corporations Act 2001 s 180(2). Under s 180(2): 
A director or other officer of a corporation who makes a business judgment is 
taken to meet the requirements of subsection (1), and their equivalent duties at 
common law and in equity, in respect of the judgment if they: (a) make the 
judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; (b) do not have a material personal 
interest in the subject matter of the judgment; (c) inform themselves about the 
subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be 
appropriate; and (d) rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests 
of the corporation. The director's or officer’s belief that the judgment is in the 
best interests of the corporation is a rational one unless the belief is one that no 
reasonable person in their position would hold.  
Id. Section 180(3) defines business judgment as “any decision to take or not take action 
in respect of a matter relevant to the business operations of the corporation.” Id. s 
180(3). 
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were unsuccessful. 159  A possible explanation for this is that any 
behavior by a director that constituted a breach of the duty of care in 
s 180(1) would likely negate the business judgment rule in s 180(2).160  
 Like the United States, Australian fiduciary duties run to the 
corporation and can be enforced by the corporation itself or by its 
shareholders via a derivative suit.161  However, unlike the United 
States, the Australian statutory regime allows ASIC to take 
enforcement action against directors personally in response to alleged 
breaches of the statutory duties.162 The statutory directors’ duties are 
enforced under the civil penalty regime.163 ASIC can commence these 
actions when it is in the public interest to do so.164 
1.  Sanctions for Breach of Duty 
 The civil penalty orders that can be sought include pecuniary 
penalties, disqualification, and compensation orders. The maximum 
pecuniary penalty that can be imposed following a declaration that a 
director has breached the statutory duties is AUD $200,000 per 
breach. 165  Pecuniary penalty orders can be imposed where the 
contravention of duty “materially prejudices the interests of the 
corporation or scheme, or its members; or materially prejudices the 
corporation’s ability to pay its creditors; or is serious.”166 Pecuniary 
                                                                                                                      
 159. Michael Legg & Dean Jordan, The Australian Business Judgment Rule 
after ASIC v Rich, 62 KEEPING GOOD COMPANIES 388 (citing Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n 
v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253 as an example where directors unsuccessfully attempted to 
rely on the business judgment rule).  
 160. Id. at 389.  
 161. Id. s 236 (granting shareholders the right to bring proceedings on behalf of 
the company).  
 162. Id. ss 1317E, 1317J(1) (allowing ASIC to issue proceedings seeking civil 
penalty orders following a contravention of the statutory directors’ duties). The 
statutory scheme also allows corporations to seek compensation orders following a 
contravention of a statutory duty. See id. s 1317J(2).  
 163. See Corporations Act 2001 s 1317J (detailing who may apply for a 
declaration or order enforcing civil consequences when there is a contravention of civil 
penalty provisions). A breach of the statutory duties other than the duty of care may, 
under certain circumstances, constitute a criminal offense and criminal sanctions may 
be imposed. See generally Corporations Act 2001 ss 181−184 (discussing civil 
obligations and criminal sanctions). A contravention of the duty of care in s 180(1) 
cannot constitute a criminal offense. A civil penalty application is the most severe 
enforcement action that can be initiated by the ASIC in response to an alleged breach 
of the statutory duty of care. Id. 
 164. See Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) pt 1, 
div 1(2) (Austl.) (setting out ASIC’s public interest objectives). 
 165. Corporations Act 2001 s 1317G. The Australian dollar is roughly equivalent 
to USD $1.07, making AUD $200,000 equal to approximately USD $214,000. 
Australian Dollar to US Dollar Rate, XE, http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert/ 
?Amount=1&From=AUD&To=USD (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
 166. Corporations Act 2001 s 1317G(1). 
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penalties ranging from AUD $5,000 to $450,000 have been imposed 
since the inception of the regime in 1993.167 
 Before the court can order the payment of compensation, it must 
be satisfied that a breach of duty has occurred and that the 
corporation has suffered damage as a result of that breach.168 The 
amount of the compensation order cannot exceed the loss caused by 
the breach.169 Punitive damages are not authorized.170 Typically the 
amount ordered is equivalent to the loss caused by the director’s 
breach, 171  although in some cases a lesser amount has been 
ordered.172 Compensation orders have ranged from AUD $65,000173 
to AUD $92 million.174 
 The court may also order that a person be disqualified from 
managing corporations for a period it thinks appropriate if it is 
satisfied that disqualification is justified. Under s 206C(2) of the 
Corporations Act, “[i]n determining whether the disqualification is 
justified, the Court may have regard to: (a) the person’s conduct in 
relation to the management, business or property of any corporation; 
and (b) any other matters that the Court considers appropriate.”175 
                                                                                                                      
 167. See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483 (Austl.) 
(imposing pecuniary penalties of $5,000 and $450,000 on former directors of HIH). 
 168. See Corporations Act 2001 ss 1317H(1), 1317HA(1) (clarifying requirements 
for compensation orders). 
 169. See id. s 1317H (providing that compensation can be ordered for damage 
suffered as a result of a contravention of the directors’ duty provisions). The section 
does not specifically authorize compensation that exceeds the amount of damage 
suffered. Id. 
 170. See id. (providing for compensatory damages only).  
 171. For example, in Australian Securities & Investment Commission v Rich 
(2003) 44 ACSR 682 (Austl.), Mr. Keeling, a former director of One.Tel Ltd., consented 
to a declaration of contravention being made that he contravened the duty of care. The 
loss caused by the contravention was AUD $92 million. Id. A compensation order for 
that amount was imposed. Id. 
 172. For example, the quantum of the compensation order was less than the loss 
caused by the defendant’s contravention in Australian Securities & Investment 
Commission v Forem-Freeway Enterprises. Pty. Ltd. (1999) 30 ACSR 339 (Austl.). In 
this case, Justice Madgwick stated it would be difficult to accurately assess the amount 
of the loss that had resulted from the defendant’s contravention. Id. As the defendant 
was bankrupt and there was little chance of any recovery, there was no need to 
precisely assess the amount of the loss. Id. 
 173. Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n v Petsas (2005) 23 ACLC 269 (Austl.). 
 174. Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 682. 
 175. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206C(2) (Austl.). Under s 206A(1), a person 
who has been disqualified from acting as a director pursuant to the civil penalty regime 
commits an offense if:  
(a) they make, or participate in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a 
substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or (b) they exercise the 
capacity to affect significantly the corporation's financial standing; or (c) they 
communicate instructions or wishes (other than advice given by the person in 
the proper performance of functions attaching to the person's professional 
capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation) to 
the directors of the corporation: (i) knowing that the directors are accustomed 
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There is no limit on the length of the disqualification order that can 
be imposed. Australian courts have imposed several permanent 
disqualification orders in recent years in cases where there were 
multiple contraventions of multiple provisions.176  
2. Prohibition on Indemnification and Company-Provided 
Insurance 
 In contrast to common practice in the United States, Australian 
corporations are prohibited from exempting directors from liability for 
pecuniary penalty and compensation orders imposed under the civil 
penalty regime.177 Nor is it possible to indemnify directors for legal 
costs incurred defending civil penalty proceedings, if the director is 
found to have breached his duty.178 This prohibition extends to civil 
penalty proceedings that seek pecuniary penalty, compensation, and 
disqualification orders. Corporations are also prohibited from paying 
for insurance against director liability arising from conduct that 
involves a willful breach of duty.179 While it is theoretically possible 
for directors to obtain their own insurance policies, such policies 
usually exclude coverage for liability arising from a willful breach.180 
Finally, due to the personal nature of the penalty, it is not possible to 
insure against the impact of a disqualification order.  
3.  The Rationale for the Civil Penalty Regime 
 It is generally accepted in Australia that there is a role for both 
public and private enforcement of directors’ duties. From as early as 
the mid-twentieth century many Australian states recognized the 
need to provide public authorities the ability to enforce directors’ 
duties. The first statutory duties that allowed for public enforcement 
in the English-speaking world were adopted in the state of Victoria in 
                                                                                                                      
to act in accordance with the person’s instructions or wishes; or (ii) intending 
that the directors will act in accordance with those instructions or wishes.  
Id. s 206C(2). 
 176. See Michelle Welsh, Civil Penalty Orders: Assessing the Appropriate Length 
and Quantum of Disqualification and Pecuniary Penalty Orders, 31 AUSTL. B. REV. 96, 
107 (2008) (noting that as of December 31, 2007, four such permanent disqualification 
orders had been entered). 
 177. See Corporations Act 2001 s 199A(2) (forbidding indemnification of liability 
for a pecuniary penalty under s 1317G or a compensation order under ss 1317H or 
1317HA). 
 178. See id. s 199A(3) (stating the conditions under which a company must not 
indemnify a person against legal costs incurred in defending an action). 
 179. See id. s 199B (discussing insurance premiums for certain liabilities). 
 180. Michael Quinlan & Mark Lindfield, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, 22 
COM. L.Q. 25 (2008) (Austl.), available at http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/pdf/insur/ 
pap4oct06.pdf.  
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1958. 181  Similar provisions were quickly adopted in many other 
Australian states.182 
 The civil penalty regime was added to the national corporate law 
in 1993. 183  Before then, the statutory directors’ duties were 
exclusively criminal provisions. 184  Advocates of the civil penalty 
regime argued that its introduction was necessary in order to 
overcome difficulties associated with the existing criminal sanctions. 
They maintained that the civil penalty regime would make it easier 
to obtain penalty orders, and thereby enhance the deterrent effect of 
the law.185 
 Civil penalties were viewed as easier to obtain than traditional 
criminal penalties because of the lighter standards of proof.186 Civil 
penalty proceedings are treated as civil proceedings for the purposes 
                                                                                                                      
 181. Companies Act 1958 (Vic) s 107 (Austl.). The Victorian duties were 
introduced following an inquiry into a series of self-interested transactions involving 
the directors of Freighters Ltd., a publicly listed company. The inquiry found that 
while no criminal law had been breached, certain transactions revealed “a complete 
lack of appreciation of the standards demanded of and displayed by public company 
directors.” P.D. PHILLIPS, PARLIAMENTARY PAPER NO. 2, REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR 
APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE AFFAIRS OF FREIGHTERS LIMITED PURSUANT TO THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE COMPANIES (SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS) ACT 1940 (1956) (Vic) 29 
(Austl.); see also Harris, Hargovan & Austin, supra note 151, at 360–61 (discussing the 
role of public interest in statutory duties). 
 182. See, e.g., Companies Act 1961 (NSW) s 124 (Austl.) (establishing duties and 
liabilities of officers in New South Wales). Until ASIC was established in 1991 as the 
Australian Securities Commission (ASC), statutory duties were enforced by the 
National Companies and Securities Commission and the Corporate Affairs offices of 
the states and territories. In 1998, the ASC was renamed ASIC and assumed added 
responsibilities for consumer protection in superannuation, insurance and, deposit 
taking. 
 183. Civil penalty provisions were introduced on the recommendation of the 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (the “Cooney 
Committee”), which found that there had been a lack of public enforcement of the 
directors’ duties. Its advocates argued that the lack of successful prosecutions leading 
to imprisonment led to community discontent and to a belief by some that the law had 
fallen into disrepute, as there was no credible accountability mechanism for breaches of 
the statutory duties. S. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, 
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., COMPANY DIRECTORS’ DUTIES: REPORT ON THE SOCIAL AND 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 192 (1989) (Austl.) 
[hereinafter COONEY REPORT].  
 184. See Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) s 232(3) (Austl.) (stating the applicable 
penalty for a contravention of duties as $20,000 or imprisonment for five years if “the 
contravention was committed with intent to deceive or defraud the company, members 
or creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for any other fraudulent 
purpose”). 
 185. See COONEY REPORT, supra note 183, at 187–89. 
 186. See Michael Gillooly & Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Civil Penalties in 
Australian Legislation, 13 U. TAS. L. REV. 269, 270 (1994) (Austl.). 
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of applying the rules of evidence and procedure.187 The standard of 
proof is proof on the balance of probabilities.188  
 Another perceived advantage was that the civil penalty regime 
would limit the reach of criminal sanctions, which was seen as 
desirable by those who believed that criminal sanctions were not 
appropriate for regulatory offenses.189 The existing criminal sanctions 
were retained for statutory duties other than the duty of care.190 
Thus, ASIC has at its disposal both criminal and civil penalties for 
breaches of the directors’ duties, other than the duty of care.191  
C. Enforcing the Duty of Care in Australia 
 U.S. and Australian corporate law share the same theoretical 
objective—to ensure that corporate directors and officers work to 
                                                                                                                      
 187. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317L (Austl.) (establishing the civil 
evidence and procedure rules for declarations of contravention and civil penalty 
orders). 
 188. Id. s 1332. Given the nature of the penalties that can be imposed under 
these provisions the courts have stated that the burden of proof is to be applied in 
accordance with the manner described by Justice Dixon in Briginshaw v Briginshaw 
(1938) 60 CLR 336, 368 (Austl.). 
 189. See Mirko Bagaric, The “Civil-isation” of the Criminal Law, 25 CRIM. L.J. 
184, 186–87, 192 (2001) (discussing proportionality between the purpose and the 
means selected to achieve it); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the 
Criminal and Civil Law Models–And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 
1876 (1992) (proposing that criminal law should be reserved for conduct that lacks 
social utility whereas civil penalties should be used where the activity has positive 
social utility but imposes externalities on others); AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N 
[ALRC], REPORT NO. 95, PRINCIPLED REGULATION: FEDERAL CIVIL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES IN AUSTRALIA ¶ 3.37 (2003) (listing common arguments 
against criminalizing regulatory contraventions). 
 190. See Corporations Act 2001 s 184 (detailing the circumstances under which a 
contravention of the directors’ duties contained in ss 181-183 will constitute a crime). 
 191. COONEY REPORT, supra note 183, at 187. Michael Gething argues that in 
relation to the directors’ duties contained in the Corporations Act there is a need for a 
range of sanctions to allow ASIC to effectively enforce the provisions. Michael Gething, 
Do We Really Need Criminal and Civil Penalties for Contraventions of Directors’ 
Duties?, 24 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 375, 376 (1996); see also Vivien Goldwasser, CLERP 
6—Implications and Ramifications for the Regulation of Australian Financial Markets, 
17 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 206, 212 (1999) (Austl.). Another advantage of the provision of 
a range of enforcement options that include civil penalties is that it can protect society 
from both under-enforcement and over-enforcement. Civil penalties protect against 
under-enforcement because they allow the regulator to take enforcement action in 
situations where the conduct is not severe enough to justify the commencement of a 
criminal prosecution. If civil penalties did not exist, these contraventions could be 
subjected only to a civil action for damages. Civil penalties protect against over-
enforcement by “providing a noncriminal punitive sanction for conduct that otherwise 
would be pushed into the criminal paradigm because its severity makes it 
unreasonable to impose only a remedial sanction.” Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil 
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 
1865 (1992); see also SIMPSON, supra note 132, at 73–78 (discussing the use of civil law 
to deter corporate crime). 
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protect the interests of the corporation and its investors. In the 
United States, directors’ duties are enforced principally through 
private litigation. In Australia, private enforcement against outside 
directors plays an insignificant role, 192  but ASIC enjoys broad 
enforcement authority. These differences in enforcement structure 
matter little, however, unless the Australian system leads to different 
results in cases involving failures of director oversight. If Australian 
directors face no greater liability risk than U.S. directors, then there 
will be no significant difference in accountability between the two 
regimes.  
 A recent study by Professors Cheffins and Black assessed the 
risk of personal liability for directors of Australian corporations and 
concluded the risk was low. Professors Cheffins and Black examined 
the incidence of out-of-pocket payments by directors of public 
companies across a number of jurisdictions, including the United 
States and Australia.193 They reported that there did not appear to be 
a single reported case where private litigation against directors 
resulted in an outside director of an Australian public company being 
ordered to pay out of pocket following a finding of a breach of duty of 
care.194 However, they did identify several cases where civil penalty 
applications sought by ASIC resulted in out-of-pocket payments by 
                                                                                                                      
 192. The lack of private enforcement of directors’ duties in Australia may be due 
in part to cost rules which make it likely that plaintiffs who lose an application for 
leave to bring a derivative suit will have costs ordered against them. Even if plaintiffs 
succeed in the application for leave, they are not automatically entitled to an order that 
the corporation pay the costs of the substantive suit. See Cheffins & Black, supra note 
11, at 1433–35 (discussing the obstacles to derivative litigation). The introduction of 
shareholder class actions and litigation funders in Australia may impact the number of 
private suits filed against directors in the future. See Graeme Gurney & Michael Legg, 
Shareholder Activism: Consumerism, Class Actions and Litigation Funding, 25 AMPLA 
Y.B. 255, 255–84 (2006) (Austl.); Shueh Hann Lim, Do Litigation Funders Add Value to 
Corporate Governance in Australia?, 29 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 135 (2011) (Austl.). For a 
general discussion of the differences between the U.S. and Australian derivative 
actions, see Lynden Griggs, The Statutory Derivative Action: Lessons That May Be 
Learnt from Its Past!, 6 U.W. SYDNEY L. REV. 63 (2002); Lang Thai, How Popular Are 
Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia? Comparisons with United States, Canada 
and New Zealand, 30 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 118, 118–37 (2002); Kurt A. Goehre, Is the 
Demand Requirement Obsolete? How the United Kingdom Modernized Its Shareholder 
Derivative Procedure and What the United States Can Learn from It, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
140 (2010) (comparing the statutory derivative procedure in the United Kingdom with 
the United States and Australia). 
 193. Cheffins & Black, supra note 11, at 1385. 
 194. See id. at 1433–34. The authors refer to Joanna Bird, The Duty of Care and 
the CLERP Reforms, 17 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 141 (1999) (Austl.), which cites four cases 
in which judgment was entered against a director for a breach of the duty of care 
combined with other breaches. Id. at 150. None of these cases involved an outside 
director of a public company. Id.; see also Hill, Regulatory Responses, supra note 11, at 
401 (“Traditionally the level of legal action against directors and officers in Australia 
tended to be low.”).  
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directors.195 After assessing directors’ liability exposure in all of the 
countries in their study, Cheffins and Black concluded that “the 
largest source of risk [of personal liability] is efforts by government 
agencies to make an example of particular directors.”196 The statutory 
duties in Australia allow this risk to be realized.  
 ASIC has brought several additional high-profile actions against 
outside directors of Australian corporations since the date of the 
Cheffins and Black study.197 These more recent cases suggest that 
liability risks for outside directors are greater than previously 
perceived.198  A review of ASIC’s recent enforcement record shows 
that a breach of statutory duties exposes directors to a nontrivial risk 
of personal liability. In addition, as noted below, outside directors risk 
having disqualification orders imposed against them. Cheffins and 
Black did not address this risk in their study.199 
1. ASIC’s Enforcement Record  
 Between January 1, 2000, and July 31, 2011, ASIC commenced 
civil penalty applications alleging a contravention of the statutory 
duty of care on twenty occasions.200 Most of these applications were 
issued against multiple defendants, including a number of inside and 
outside directors. Thirteen of these applications were issued against 
directors of public corporations and seven were issued against 
directors of private corporations. Although most applications alleged 
that additional provisions of the Corporations Act had been breached, 
                                                                                                                      
 195. See Cheffins & Black, supra note 11, at 1451 (“In Australia, all of the 
instances of out-of-pocket liability resulted from ASIC enforcement proceedings.”).  
 196. Id. at 1385. 
 197. See infra notes 206–35 and accompanying text (discussing recent ASIC 
actions against outside directors). 
 198. See Hill, Regulatory Responses, supra note 11, at 402 (“[O]ne development 
in Australia that has strengthened the enforcement of directors’ duties is the 
increasingly strategic use by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) of the civil penalty regime as a regulatory mechanism.”). 
 199. Cheffins & Black, supra note 11, at 1392 (“[W]e treat disqualification 
[orders] as beyond the paper’s scope because a financial penalty is not an intrinsic 
aspect of the sanction.”). 
 200. See Media Releases and Advisories, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMMISSION, 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/Media%20and%20information%20re
leases%20Home%20Page (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). The author examined the 
corresponding civil penalty judgments. To identify the civil penalty judgments the 
author searched AustLII, CCH Online, and LexisNexis electronic databases.  
 The number of civil penalty applications may appear to be small but in the context 
of the size of Australia’s market when compared with the U.S. market, the number is 
significant. For a detailed discussion of ASIC’s enforcement patterns, see generally 
HELEN BIRD ET AL., ASIC ENFORCEMENT PATTERNS (2003); Helen Bird et al., Strategic 
Regulation and ASIC Enforcement Patterns: Results of an Empirical Study, 5 J. CORP. 
L. STUD. 191 (2005).  
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there were four cases where the only alleged contravention was a 
contravention of the duty of care.  
 For the sake of comparison it is worth noting that Australia is 
significantly smaller than the United States in terms of the size of its 
population and its economy. Its population is roughly one-tenth that 
of the United States201 as is the size of its economy as measured by 
GDP.202 The United States has roughly three times as many publicly 
traded corporations.203 This sizable differential should be taken into 
account when considering the number and type of enforcement 
actions initiated by ASIC.  
a. The James Hardie Group 
 Several recent cases demonstrate the potential of ASIC’s 
enforcement actions to hold directors accountable for failures in 
oversight. The civil penalty application that received the most 
publicity in recent years is the James Hardie application issued by 
ASIC in 2007.204 The James Hardie Group is a billion dollar global 
enterprise that produces fiber-cement construction products, such as 
exterior siding and roofing materials, used throughout the world.205 
The company had produced and distributed asbestos products during 
much of the twentieth century. Cancers and respiratory illnesses 
were linked to exposure to asbestos, and by 2001 there had been 
numerous claims for compensation made against entities of the 
James Hardie Group. While the group was no longer involved in the 
sale of asbestos products, it was anticipated that it would face 
significant future compensation claims.206  
 In 2001, Hardie’s board of directors considered a proposal to 
restructure the company under a new holding company to be 
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 204. See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n v Macdonald (No. 11) (2009) 230 FLR 1 
(Austl.). 
 205. About James Hardie, JAMESHARDIE.COM, http://jameshardie.com.au/main/ 
about.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
 206. See Morley v Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n (2010) 274 ALR 205, ¶ 13 (Austl.) 
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incorporated in the Netherlands. Under the proposed arrangement, 
any future decisions of Australian courts regarding the company’s 
asbestos liability would not be enforceable. 207  In order for the 
restructure to proceed, the James Hardie Group established a 
Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (the Foundation) to 
pay future asbestos related claims.208 There was great public interest 
in ensuring that the Foundation would have sufficient funds to meet 
all future claims. ASIC’s civil penalty application arose as a result of 
public statements made by the corporation about the sufficiency of 
the funds in the Foundation.  
 ASIC issued civil penalty proceedings against two corporate 
entities, three inside directors, and seven outside directors. ASIC 
alleged that various public statements made by the James Hardie 
Group of companies in relation to the funding of the Foundation were 
false and misleading, or misleading and deceptive, and as a result the 
corporations had breached various provisions of the Corporations 
Act.209 In addition, ASIC alleged that the inside and outside directors 
had breached the duty of care contained in s 180 in the preparation 
and approval of those statements.210 One of those statements was a 
draft Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) announcement stating 
that the Foundation would have sufficient funds to meet all 
legitimate asbestos claims, and that the Foundation was fully funded 
and would provide certainty for people with legitimate asbestos 
claims. Two of the outside directors attended the board meeting via 
teleconference, and it was alleged that they approved the 
announcements without seeing them or the supporting 
documentation.211 
 At first instance, the trial court found that the outside directors 
were in breach of their statutory duty of care and diligence in s 180(1) 
because they approved the draft announcement when, due to the 
information that was before them, the directors could not have been 
satisfied that the company had a proper basis for making the 
assertions contained in the announcement. The court found that: 
All of the [outside] directors . . . knew or should have known that if [the 
James Hardie Group] made the statements as to the sufficiency of 
funding of the Foundation in the Draft ASX Announcement there was 
the danger that [it] would face legal action for publishing false or 
misleading or misleading or deceptive statements, its reputation would 
suffer and there would be a market reaction to its listed securities 
. . . 
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 The fact that it was approved with its overstatement of the situation 
as to the level of funding of the Foundation . . . meant that they failed 
in their duty to [the James Hardie Group] to protect it from the harm it 
potentially faced upon publication of the Draft ASX Announcement.212  
 Each of the outside directors was disqualified from managing 
corporations for five years and ordered to pay pecuniary penalties of 
AUD $30,000.213 The disqualification orders imposed on the inside 
directors ranged from seven to fifteen years and the pecuniary 
penalty orders ranged from AUD $75,000 to AUD $350,000.214  
 The outside directors successfully appealed this decision.215 The 
court of appeal was not satisfied that the board of directors had in 
fact voted and approved the announcement that was made. However, 
the court of appeal noted that it would have been satisfied that the 
directors had breached the duty of care and diligence if it had not 
overturned the factual finding.216 ASIC has appealed this decision to 
the High Court.217 
b. Other ASIC Cases 
 Other cases in which the court imposed penalties on outside 
directors of public companies include One.Tel, HIH, and Centro 
Properties. In One.Tel, the court imposed civil penalties against John 
Greaves, an outside director and chairman of the board.218 Greaves 
was chairman of the company’s finance and audit committee. In 2004, 
ASIC obtained a declaration that Greaves had breached the duty of 
care by failing to take reasonable steps to monitor the financial 
position of the group and failing to make timely recommendations to 
the board that it cease trading or appoint an administrator. 219 
Greaves was disqualified from acting as a director for four years and 
was ordered to pay AUD $20 million in compensation plus ASIC’s 
costs.220 ASIC’s civil penalty proceedings against two other directors 
                                                                                                                      
 212. Id. ¶¶ 259, 343. 
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of One.Tel Ltd. were dismissed because ASIC failed to prove its 
pleaded case.221  
 In HIH, ASIC issued civil penalty proceedings against a number 
of HIH directors including Rodney Adler, an outside director. Prior to 
its collapse in 2001, the HIH Group was the second largest general 
insurer in Australia.222 ASIC’s claim related to the directors’ approval 
of an undocumented payment of AUD $10 million to a corporation 
controlled by Adler in the period of time leading up to the 
corporation’s collapse.223 Following a finding that he had breached 
the duty of care, other statutory directors’ duties, and other 
provisions of the Corporations Act, Adler was disqualified from 
managing corporations for twenty years and ordered to pay a total of 
AUD $450,000 in pecuniary penalties and almost AUD $8 million in 
compensation.224 
 A more recent case, Centro Properties, also ended with liability 
findings against inside and outside directors of a publicly traded 
company. Centro Properties is the second largest retail property 
operator in Australia, with revenues of AUD $1.3 billion.225 On June 
27, 2011, one inside and six outside directors of various entities 
within the Centro Properties Group and Centro Retail Group were 
found to have breached the statutory duty of care for approving the 
consolidated financial statements of the public company and trusts 
within the group for the 2007 fiscal year.226 The financial statements 
did not comply with the relevant accounting standards and 
regulations because they incorrectly classified short-term current 
liabilities and long term debt.227 The court found that the information 
omitted from financial statements was significant for the purpose of 
assessing the risks faced by the Centro Group. Centro nearly 
collapsed in 2007 when it announced that it could not refinance AUD 
$3.9 billion of debt.228 The court found that the directors either were 
aware of the omitted information, or that reasonably competent 
directors in their positions should have been aware.229 
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On August 31, 2011 the court disqualified one of the inside 
directors from managing corporations for two years, and imposed a 
pecuniary penalty of AUD $30,000 on the other inside director.230 The 
outside directors argued that they should be relieved from liability 
altogether and that no declarations of contravention should be made. 
However, the court disagreed, stating that this was not a case: 
[W]here a mere warning “not to do it again,” without more, [was] 
appropriate. . . . A judicial reprimand in the form of merely finding a 
contravention (without appropriate declarations) [was] not a substitute 
for punishment, and [was] not appropriate here.231  
Although the court issued declarations of contravention against the 
outside directors, it declined to impose the disqualification orders 
ASIC sought. 232  According to the court, the declarations of 
contravention were “sufficient to ‘send the message’ to the community 
that the court strongly disapproves of the conduct giving rise to the 
contraventions,”233 and the disqualification orders were unnecessary 
and excessive. 234  The Centro case is one of few civil penalty 
applications where a declaration of contravention was made and no 
penalty orders imposed. In most cases at least one of the available 
penalties was imposed following a declaration of contravention. 
2. Assessing the Impact of ASIC Enforcement  
 Overall, ASIC has achieved a high degree of success with the 
civil penalty applications it has issued. As of July 31, 2011, fifteen of 
the twenty civil penalty applications alleging a breach of the duty of 
care issued between January 1, 2000 and July 31, 2011 have been 
finalized.235 ASIC obtained a declaration that the duty of care had 
been contravened by at least one of the defendant directors in twelve 
of those fifteen cases.236 Many of these civil penalty applications were 
                                                                                                                      
 230. Id. ¶¶ 109, 134. 
 231. Id. ¶ 187. 
 232. Id. ¶ 188 (“The punishment element (which a disqualification order 
encompasses), has already been inflicted by the failure to relieve from liability and the 
making of the declarations in light of the reputational damage already inflicted upon 
these particular directors.”). 
 233. Id. ¶ 191 (expressing disapproval but also expressing sympathy regarding 
“the circumstances of the non-executive directors, the circumstances leading to the 
contraventions, and subsequent events”). 
 234. Id. ¶¶ 187−91.  
 235. See generally Media Releases and Advisories, supra note 200 (providing 
information on the civil penalty applications).  
 236. See Michelle Welsh, Civil Penalties and Responsive Regulation: The Gap 
Between Theory and Practice, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 908, 932 (2009) (discussing ASIC’s 
success with civil penalty applications). The Hardie case and the Fortescue case are 
counted as not finalized because they are currently on appeal before the Australian 
High Court. See Press Release, Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n, 11-214MR Decision in 
Fortescue Metals Group Appeal (Sept. 29, 2011), available at 
2012] toward a public enforcement model 387 
issued against high-profile directors. 237  When these high-profile 
proceedings are successful they not only ensure that the offending 
director is held to account for his or her wrongdoing, but the publicity 
generated sends a strong deterrent message to other directors in the 
community.238 
 In particular, the cases involving James Hardie, Centro, and 
HIH attracted significant publicity. The judgments sent a strong 
deterrent message to directors that the cost of not complying with the 
duty of care can be significant, especially if lengthy disqualification 
orders are imposed. Arguably a disqualification order of any length 
will end the career of outside directors of public companies. Of equal 
importance is the fact that these cases send a strong message to the 
business community about the standard of behavior that is expected 
of outside directors of public companies. This message is important 
for the vast number of directors motivated by normative and social 
factors. What is moral and socially desirable is shaped by both the 
attitudes of the regulatory authorities—in this case ASIC—and the 
courts in relation to contraventions of that law. A vigorous 
enforcement of the law influences such persons’ perception of the 
importance of the law, and therefore their commitment to compliance. 
 Despite its level of success, in recent years ASIC’s ability to 
obtain civil penalty orders was impacted by several court decisions 
that placed greater procedural burdens on the regulator. The 
objective of the civil penalty regime was to provide ASIC with a 
penalty that was easier to obtain than criminal sanctions. However, 
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various protections introduced by the courts in civil penalty 
proceedings have made it difficult for ASIC to succeed in several 
recent civil penalty applications.239 There has been at least one case 
in which ASIC suffered a high-profile defeat in recent years.240  
 Nonetheless, civil penalties remain important regulatory 
mechanisms. The penalty regime allows ASIC to take enforcement 
action in situations where it would otherwise be unable to act.241 The 
duty of care contained in s 180 of the Corporations Act does not 
attract criminal liability, so without the civil penalty regime, court-
based enforcement action instigated by the regulator would not be 
possible. According to ASIC, civil penalty applications feature 
strongly in what it regards as the key results it achieves each year.242  
 While ASIC’s use of the civil penalty regime likely has had an 
impact on compliance levels, we acknowledge that there is no reliable 
method of testing this hypothesis empirically. One cannot prove that 
public enforcement has provided an effective deterrent, set minimum 
standards of corporate managerial behavior, or encouraged directors 
and officers motivated by calculated, normative, or social factors to 
comply more readily with their duty of care. There is simply no 
accurate way to measure compliance levels with the duty of care. The 
use of surveys to measure compliance has previously been seen to be 
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unreliable. 243  Similarly, measuring the number of enforcement 
actions alleging a contravention of the duty of care over a certain 
period of time would not give a true indication of compliance levels. A 
rise or fall in the number of enforcement actions initiated by ASIC 
may not indicate a rise or fall in compliance with the duty of care. 
Changes in enforcement statistics may be caused by many factors, 
including changes in the regulator’s enforcement priorities, 
personnel, resources, and surveillance capabilities.244  
 However, one can draw on the results of an empirical study 
previously undertaken by one of the authors. This study measured 
the impact of ASIC’s enforcement of a different statutory provision.245 
The research was undertaken in the context of the Australian 
continuous disclosure provisions, which require listed corporations to 
disclose price sensitive information to the ASX as soon as the 
corporation becomes aware of that information. 246  The author 
collected empirical data by counting the number of price sensitive 
disclosures and mapping those disclosures against the introduction of 
different enforcement regimes and changes in enforcement practices 
by ASIC.247  
 This study showed that a marked increase in the number of 
announcements occurred immediately following a period when ASIC 
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increased its enforcement activity. 248  This finding suggests that 
enforcement action by ASIC is an important factor in encouraging 
corporate compliance. ASIC enforcement proceedings may act as a 
deterrent to persons motivated by calculated factors who are inclined 
toward noncompliance. A perceived increase in the risk that a 
contravention may result in enforcement activity may also strengthen 
a commitment to compliance by persons motivated by social and 
normative factors. The perceived legitimacy and importance of the 
continuous disclosure requirements may have increased when ASIC 
began to enforce them actively.  
 The results of this research support our hypothesis that an 
effective accountability mechanism plays an important role in 
encouraging corporate compliance. Enforcement activity can increase 
the deterrent effect of the law. In addition, an effective accountability 
mechanism evidenced by enforcement activity encourages corporate 
actors who are motivated by normative and social factors to 
implement measures to ensure that their corporations are compliant.  
V. ENVISIONING PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS’  
DUTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 In the United States, the federal securities law regime provides 
for overlapping and concurrent public and private remedies for 
securities law violations. In addition, federal law coexists with state 
securities laws, which also provide for both public and private 
enforcement. Under state corporate laws, where most substantive 
standards for director conduct arise, there are no provisions for public 
enforcement of fiduciary duties. Given the broad public interest in 
effective corporate governance, the absence of mechanisms for formal 
public oversight of director conduct is striking. 
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 It is important to acknowledge that U.S. regulators can pursue 
cases involving financial misstatements and fraud through the 
securities enforcement regime. However, such enforcement actions 
rarely impact a firm’s outside directors.249 For example, independent 
investigations of the Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman failures 
revealed serious lapses in director oversight, yet regulators did not 
charge any of the directors of these corporations with fraud. 250 
Although outside directors of these corporations faced private 
shareholder suits, only Enron and WorldCom directors made personal 
payments to settle such claims. 251  Furthermore, the personal 
payments included in the Enron and WorldCom settlements were 
anomalies that have not been replicated since. 252  Loyalty-based 
claims also rarely lead to personal payments by outside directors.253 
Thus, even in cases involving financial misstatements, self-dealing, 
and fraud, outside directors in Australia are more likely to face 
enforcement actions and personal penalties than similarly situated 
directors in the United States. 
 Although Australia’s regulatory regime seems to offer some 
advantages over the U.S. system, the U.S. corporate governance 
system does not easily lend itself to adopting the Australian 
approach. Deeply ingrained concepts of federalism in the United 
States make imagining public enforcement of fiduciary duties appear 
somewhat fanciful. The United States divides authority over 
corporate regulation between federal and state authorities, with state 
governments taking the lead in defining and enforcing fiduciary 
duties.254  This traditional division of labor presents challenges to 
reforming U.S. corporate law along the Australian model. Despite 
these conceptual obstacles, careful analysis of U.S. enforcement 
practices suggests that such reforms would be less radical than they 
may appear at first blush. 
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A. Some Advantages of Australia’s Enforcement Regime  
 One advantage of the Australian system is that it allows 
proceedings alleging a breach of the duty of care to be issued against 
directors when it is in the public interest to do so. Mechanisms for 
director accountability do not rely solely on incentives for private 
litigators working on a contingent basis. In the United States, courts 
and commentators worry that such incentives often lead lawyers to 
pursue speculative cases in pursuit of large damage awards, or pass 
up meritorious cases if the prospective damages are too small to 
justify the risk of litigation.255 By contrast, in Australia, ASIC can 
take up a case in the public interest even when the size of the case 
would not warrant a contingent fee lawsuit.  
 Another advantage of the Australian system is that public 
enforcement provides the prospect of personal accountability for 
directors through the imposition of disqualification orders and 
pecuniary penalties that cannot be indemnified or insured at 
company expense. This regulatory flexibility means the regulator can 
provide for penalties that will deter those motivated chiefly by 
calculated factors, while also providing more modest penalties for less 
culpable actors to reinforce norms for those motivated by normative 
and social factors. 
1. Pecuniary Penalties 
 In the United States, the penalties for a breach of fiduciary duty 
can be harsh and, according to some, disproportionate to a director’s 
degree of culpability.256 Legal sanctions for breach of duty are not tied 
to the seriousness of a director’s misconduct. Instead the penalty is 
determined by the losses that a company suffers as a result of the 
breach.257 Thus, “[f]or a multibillion dollar company, a single mistake 
could mean millions of dollars of damages to be borne by the 
directors.”258 As one of us has previously argued, two problems can 
arise from depending on draconian penalty schemes to discipline 
directors. First, if the requisite penalty is harsh, courts may be 
                                                                                                                      
 255. See Stephen Choi, The Evidence in Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 1465, 1489 (2004) (describing factors attorneys consider when deciding whether to 
pursue litigation, including the risk that damages awards will not be high enough to 
cover attorney’s costs); Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims 
and Private Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 574 (2000) (explaining that 
asymmetric risks affect lawyers’ decisions in settlement and bringing claims). 
 256. Jones, supra note 5, at 148.  
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
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reluctant to impose it, and second, harsh penalty schemes may 
undermine the internalization of proper moral values.259  
 One advantage we see in the Australian enforcement regime is 
that pecuniary penalties can be calibrated to reflect the seriousness of 
the harm and the degree of culpability of the director. Pecuniary 
penalties that are capped at AUD $200,000 are less severe than the 
damages awards or settlements of the size likely to attract contingent 
fee litigators. 260  If the United States adopted a similar system, 
whereby pecuniary penalties are calibrated to reflect an individual 
director’s culpability, such flexibility could help overcome some of the 
objections that the tort measure of damages raises in the current 
enforcement regime. 
2. Disqualification Orders 
 ASIC is also authorized to seek disqualification orders, which 
can serve multiple objectives. The orders protect the public from 
future harm that may be caused by inattentive or incompetent 
directors. They also serve as an individual deterrent, and as a form of 
punishment.261 Most importantly, the disqualification order ensures a 
measure of personal accountability for directors that is not available 
under the U.S. system. Unlike monetary settlements and damages 
                                                                                                                      
 259. See id. at 148–52 (summarizing nullification problems and reviewing 
studies showing that harsh penalties can interfere with internalization of proper moral 
values). 
 260. Compensation orders are also available under the Australian regime to 
compensate victims of wrongdoing. The quantum of a compensation order is limited to 
the loss suffered as a result of the contravention and punitive damages are not 
available. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 261. Australian courts have recognized that the main aim of the disqualification 
order is to provide protection for the wider public. For example, in Australian 
Securities & Investment Commission v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483, ¶ 56, the court noted 
that the public needs protection against the misuse of the corporate structure by 
directors who are unfit to hold office. In Australian Securities & Investment 
Commission v Forem-Freeway Enterprises Pty. Ltd. (1999) 30 ACSR 339, the court 
recognized that the aim of the disqualification order is to protect the public, and as a 
result, the capacity of the defendant to cause harm to the public must be given 
consideration by the court when it is deciding whether or not to impose a 
disqualification order. Australian courts also recognize that the imposition of a 
disqualification order involves aspects of personal and general deterrence, and that it 
can have a punitive effect. See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n v Beekink (2007) 61 ACSR 
305, 314–15 (“What is required in their case is a penalty sufficient to satisfy the 
punitive objectives of the applicable law, to be seen to be a personal deterrent and to be 
apparent as a deterrent to the general public against a repetition of like conduct.”); 
Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR. 373, ¶ 150 (listing principles 
and factors in finding disqualification orders); Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n v Vines (2006) 
58 ACSR 298, 311–2, 333, 346 (describing the punitive penalties to the directors and 
that they should be no greater than necessary to achieve the deterrent purpose); Austl. 
Sec. & Inv. Comm’n v White (2006) 58 ACSR 261, 265–67; Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n v 
Plymin (2003) 21 ACLC 1237, 1241. 
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awards, a disqualification order cannot be indemnified or insured 
away. 
 One of us conducted interviews with a former senior enforcement 
officer from ASIC. The officer stated that ASIC sees disqualification 
orders as the most important of the three orders that are available.262 
Disqualification orders are important and useful remedies because 
they provide a mechanism whereby people who should not manage 
corporations are removed from such positions.263  
 Pecuniary penalties and disqualification orders help promote 
accountability for corporate officials in Australia. Because the 
penalties are comparatively mild and can be tailored to be 
proportionate to the harm caused and the degree of culpability of each 
individual director, courts may be more likely to impose such 
penalties when the circumstance warrant. Disqualification orders act 
as personal and general deterrents. They allow for the removal of 
incompetent directors, and most importantly, directors cannot 
contract out of the personal impact of such orders. 
B. Implementing Public Enforcement  
 U.S. policymakers should consider Australia’s public 
enforcement model. In particular, the disqualification order, or bar on 
future service as a director, is a remedy that should be added to the 
arsenal of state and federal regulators, so that they may more 
effectively enforce directors’ oversight duties. Despite the many 
salutary aspects of the Australian enforcement regime, any effort to 
adopt a comparable system in the United States would face a number 
of challenges. America’s peculiar brand of corporate federalism 
creates ideological and conceptual barriers that must be overcome 
before the United States could embrace public enforcement of 
fiduciary duties. 
1. Federalism Constraints 
 Corporate federalism concepts present the most significant 
obstacle to adoption of public enforcement of fiduciary duties in the 
United States. There are at least two ways that federalism notions 
                                                                                                                      
 262. Interview with Senior Enforcement Officer, Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n, in 
Melb., Austl. (Dec. 8, 2006). The senior enforcement officer requested that she not be 
named and that no direct quotations be attributed to her. See also Welsh, supra note 
236, at 929 (expressing that prior to beginning a civil penalty application, ASIC 
considers alternative available remedies such as disqualification orders as a regulatory 
response).  
 263. See generally Welsh, supra note 176 (explaining that the courts’ view that 
disqualification orders protect the public from actions of incapable directors impacts 
the length of disqualification). 
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could impede implementation of a public enforcement regime. First, 
unlike ASIC, the SEC lacks formal authority to enforce corporate law 
rules. Although the SEC’s enforcement powers mirror ASIC’s to a 
significant extent, the United States has no federal corporate statute. 
Instead, corporate law is the province of the states and each state has 
its own statute enforced by its judiciary.264 Further, states do not 
provide mechanisms for public officials to enforce directors’ duties. 
Instead, the state law system relies exclusively on shareholder 
litigation to police director conduct.265 
 Given the existing corporate governance structure, providing for 
public enforcement of fiduciary duties would require one of two 
possible reforms. The first would be to empower the SEC explicitly to 
enforce directors’ fiduciary duties. The second would be for states to 
empower its public officials to oversee director conduct. Standard 
federalism conventions would likely complicate efforts to adopt either 
reform. Yet careful examination of the powers and practices of state 
and federal regulators reveals that the types of reforms envisioned 
here represent a logical extension of state and federal regulators’ 
existing enforcement powers. 
2. SEC Enforcement 
 One possible mechanism for creating public enforcement of 
directors’ oversight duties would be to grant the SEC explicit 
authority to enforce the director obligations that were created under 
federal statutes such as Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank. As the law 
stands, the SEC already has the power to penalize securities law 
violations that also constitute fiduciary breaches. As many 
commentators have noted, cases of corporate fraud often involve 
fiduciary breaches, as when directors fail to prevent misleading 
public statements or fraudulent financial reports.266 
 Since 1990, the SEC has enjoyed explicit power to bar those who 
violate the securities laws’ anti-fraud provisions from future service 
as an officer or director of any public company. 267  In 2002, the 
                                                                                                                      
 264. See Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons 
from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1829–31 (2006) (discussing limitations on state 
courts’ ability to police corporate misconduct). 
 265. See id. at 1831 (noting that states’ failure to provide for public enforcement 
of corporate law may lead to under-enforcement of corporate norms). 
 266. See Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) 
(“In the twentieth century state corporate law norms for the large publicly held 
corporation have been progressively supplanted by federal standards . . . .”); Robert B. 
Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections 
upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860–63 (2003) (observing that U.S. corporate 
governance is now largely the province of federal securities law). 
 267. See Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the “Unfitness” Question, 47 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 9, 13–14 (2005) [hereinafter Barnard, Unfitness Question] (describing the SEC’s 
396  vanderbilt journal of transnational law [vol. 45:343 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act eased the SEC’s burden in seeking such bars. 
First, Sarbanes-Oxley lowered the standard for imposing a bar from 
“substantial unfitness” to serve as an officer or director to mere 
“unfitness.”268 Second, Sarbanes-Oxley allows the SEC to impose bars 
in administrative proceedings in addition to federal court 
proceedings.269 
 Despite this expanded authority, the SEC has remained 
reluctant to impose bars as a remedy for director oversight failures. 
Instead, the SEC seeks bars against outside directors only in the 
most egregious cases, where directors flagrantly disregarded multiple 
red flags indicating fraud.270 Recent SEC cases pursuing bars against 
outside directors have focused on members of the audit committee, 
particularly committee chairs who assumed some investigative 
responsibilities. For example, in two recent enforcement actions 
against outside directors, the directors had ignored multiple employee 
warnings, ignored auditor and law firm resignations, or allowed 
executives suspected of misconduct to retain their positions of 
authority and thus continue their fraud.271 
                                                                                                                      
authority to impose bar orders under the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny 
Stock Reform Act of 1990); Jayne W. Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive 
“Substantially Unfit to Serve”?, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1522 (1992) (noting that the 
potential impact of the Remedies Act’s debarment powers); Jon Carlson, Note, 
Securities Fraud, Officer and Director Bars, and the Unfitness Inquiry After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 679, 685 (2009) (noting that when Congress 
passed the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act it sought to 
“maximize the remedial effects of its enforcement actions” and to “achieve the 
appropriate level of deterrence in each case”). 
 268. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1105, 116 Stat. 745, 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-l(f), 78u-3(f) (2006)). 
 269. Id.; Barnard, Unfitness Question, supra note 267, at 19–20. 
 270. See Floyd Norris, For Boards, SEC Keeps the Bar Low, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2011, at B1 (“[T]he commission has chosen not to proceed in cases in which there was 
anything less than severe recklessness. If directors relied on experts like law firms or 
auditing firms, they have received the benefit of the doubt. No outside directors of 
financial firms were named as defendants in cases the S.E.C. filed that stemmed from 
the credit crisis.”); John F. Olson, SEC Targets Directors Who Ignore Red Flags, in 
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 328 (2011) (“[T]he 
Commission rarely sues directors solely in their capacity as directors. In fact, in the 
last three years, during which we brought more than 1800 enforcement actions 
involving more than 3,000 defendants and respondents, the Commission has sued less 
than a dozen outside directors.” (quoting former Enforcement Director Linda Chatman 
Thomsen)); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Military Body 
Armor Supplier and Former Outside Directors with Accounting Fraud (Feb. 28, 2011) 
(“We will not second-guess the good-faith efforts of directors. But in stark contrast [the 
defendants] repeatedly turned a blind eye to warning signs of fraud and other 
misconduct by company officers.” (quoting Director of Enforcement, Robert Khuzami)). 
 271. See Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Gupta, No. 11-7566 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 
26, 2011), 2011 WL 5105859 (presenting claims against former outside directors of 
InfoUSA); Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Krantz, 
No. 11-60432 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2011), 2011 WL 680181 (presenting claims against 
former outside directors of DHB Industries). 
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 If the SEC pursued such bars more readily it might neutralize 
some of the common objections to enforcing directors’ duties. The bar 
is more meaningful as a reputational sanction than monetary 
payments, because the signal from being named in a lawsuit or 
paying a settlement is ambiguous.272 Further, a bar prevents indolent 
directors of companies brought down by fraud from serving in similar 
capacities at other companies.273  
 Such bars could be appropriate in cases such as WorldCom and 
Enron, where public reports reveal that the directors were asleep at 
the switch and thus failed to prevent their corporations’ massive 
frauds.274 Yet former directors of these failed companies continue to 
serve as directors of other public companies.275 This suggests that the 
force of reputational sanctions that purportedly discipline directors is 
muted. Similarly, public reports on the financial crisis suggest that 
Citigroup’s directors were in the dark about the extent of its 
subprime exposure, preventing them from managing growing risks 
and ensuring the accuracy of Citigroup’s financial reports. 276 
Likewise, Lehman’s directors were seemingly unaware of the Repo 
                                                                                                                      
 272. Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE 
CONDUCT 92 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (“Not only does an 
SEC settlement not match the criminal action’s tendency to ascribe the label of 
wrongdoer to a firm, it ascribes nothing.”); see also DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES 
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 651 (2003) (noting the SEC’s common practice of 
settling cases by allowing defendants to avoid admitting liability). Recently, the SEC’s 
longstanding practice of allowing defendants to settle cases without admitting liability 
has attracted sharp judicial criticism and the attention of Congress. See Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., No. 11-7387, 2011 WL 5903733, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 28, 2011) (rejecting proposed SEC settlement as “neither fair, nor reasonable, nor 
adequate, nor in the public interest . . . because it does not provide the Court with a 
sufficient evidentiary basis to know whether the requested relief is justified under any 
of these standards”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 
509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the proposed settlement is not fair or reasonable 
even applying the most deferential standards); Peter Schroeder, Lawmakers to Press 
SEC to Change Rules on Settlements for Wrongdoing, THE HILL (Jan. 2, 2012, 6:00 
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/201915-lawmakers-
to-press-sec-to-change-rules-on-settlements-for-wrongdoing (reporting the scheduling of 
hearings to review the SEC’s settlement practices).  
 273. Regina F. Burch, Unfit to Serve Post-Enron, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1081, 1084 
(2008). 
 274. See generally BREEDEN, supra note 141 (reporting on directors’ lapses 
leading up to WorldCom’s failure); POWERS, supra note 141 (reporting on Enron 
directors’ lapses leading up to the firm’s demise). 
 275. See Steven M. Davidoff, Despite Worries, Serving at the Top Carries Little 
Risk, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/despite-
worries-serving-at-the-top-carries-little-risk (noting directors of firms that failed 
during the 2008 financial crisis continue to serve as directors of other public 
companies, including leading financial institutions). 
 276. FCIC, supra note 80, at 260–65; see also Dash & Creswell, supra note 77, at 
A1 (describing Citigroup executives’ ignorance of the scope of the firm’s subprime 
exposure).  
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105 transactions that the company used to shed billions of dollars of 
assets and debts from its balance sheet at the end of each quarter.277 
Yet despite the financial calamities facilitated in part by their 
ignorance, directors of these firms have not been held personally 
accountable for their failures.278 
 Federal governance reforms included in Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank place new obligations on independent directors.279 For 
such provisions to have meaning there must be a way to hold 
directors accountable when they fail to meet these heightened 
conduct standards. Unfortunately, neither Sarbanes-Oxley nor Dodd-
Frank created mechanisms for enforcing these new obligations. 
Because states have refrained from enforcing oversight duties, it may 
be appropriate to expand the SEC’s authority in this realm. The SEC 
already has authority to scrutinize directors’ oversight 
performance.280 To the extent that Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and 
other federal reforms create additional obligations for directors, it 
makes sense to allow a federal agency to monitor directors’ 
performance and maintain a federal standard of conduct for 
Congress’s conception of a director’s role. 
 Although current problems plaguing the SEC undermine faith in 
its ability to protect investor interests, expanding its jurisdiction to 
cover directors’ duties could result in a more efficient use of scarce 
resources. The SEC could use this power as an ancillary tool in 
ongoing investigations, achieving better investor protection with 
minimal additional costs. The risk exists that the SEC would be 
tempted to use its expanded powers to pursue a political agenda and 
                                                                                                                      
 277. See Valukas, supra note 141, at 732–35 (describing the misleading effect of 
Lehman’s accounting for its “Repo 105” transactions). 
 278. See Davidoff, supra note 275 (noting that in a twenty-six year period, only 
nine directors had been held personally liable for securities fraud); Norris, supra note 
270, at B1 (noting that corporate directors who were supposed to be watching over 
management are rarely held accountable). Several outside directors of Citigroup and 
Lehman remain subject to ongoing securities litigation in connection with inaccuracies 
in their companies’ financial statements during the run-up to the crisis. See In re 
Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (claiming 
that directors knew of false and misleading statements relating to Lehman’s Repo 105 
transactions); In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(asserting claims against directors for overstating the company’s assets). 
 279. Just as it responded to the corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 by 
specifying in Sarbanes-Oxley certain tasks directors must perform, Congress adopted 
the Dodd-Frank Act in response to the 2008 Financial Crisis. Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Like 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank includes significant governance reforms designed to 
enhance director oversight of compensation and risk. Although Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank created new responsibilities for directors, the statutes do not include 
mechanisms to hold directors accountable for their performance. Instead, Congress left 
the task of monitoring director conduct firmly in state hands. 
 280. See supra text accompanying notes 267–69. 
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make an example out of high-profile corporate leaders.281 Although 
such a risk is present, creating a regulatory “middle ground” between 
no civil charges and criminal referrals could better protect prominent 
directors from politically motivated prosecutions.282 
3. State Enforcement 
 According to the traditional division of authority in corporate 
regulation, federal law governs corporate disclosure obligations, and 
states set substantive conduct standards for officers and directors. 
Although overbroad and imprecise, this conceptual divide creates 
barriers for expanding SEC authority to regulate director conduct. 
Thus this section explores the possibility of relying on states to 
provide a better system for holding directors accountable for 
corporate oversight. There are two possible avenues for enhancing 
states’ authority to police director misconduct. First, an executive 
agency such as the attorney general might be granted authority to 
investigate and bring cases for oversight failures. Second, state 
judges could impose alternative remedies to traditional damage 
awards in cases involving a breach of the duty of oversight. 
a.  Administrative Action  
 Allowing state authorities to enforce oversight duties and impose 
officer and director bars could be an alternative to enhanced SEC 
enforcement of director oversight. For example, a state’s attorney 
general could investigate director oversight failures and seek 
penalties or bars in appropriate circumstances. Because corporate 
law is often perceived of as private law, such powers may seem 
unusual. However, the exercise of such authority would be a mere 
extension of existing state power to enforce fiduciary duties. 
 As the law currently stands, state regulators can enforce the 
duties of directors of charitable organizations, including nonprofit 
corporations.283 In most states, the attorney general exercises this 
                                                                                                                      
 281. Martha Stewart comes readily to mind. See generally MARTHA STEWART’S 
LEGAL TROUBLES (Joan McLeod Heminway ed., 2004) (describing and analyzing the 
U.S. government’s actions against domestic maven Martha Stewart for insider trading, 
obstruction of justice, and lying to investigators).  
 282. See Buell, supra note 272, at 95 (arguing for enhancing the severity of 
sanctions for corporate fraud imposed through civil proceedings to make civil actions 
more attractive to public regulators as an alternative to criminal charges); cf. Christine 
Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 368 (2008) (“[C]ivil 
law and criminal law in the corporate law arena must be harmonized to restore the 
traditional policy preferences of allowing free access to the civil courts while harnessing 
prosecutorial power.”).  
 283. Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State 
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 938 (2004).  
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authority as parens patriae.284 Extending authority to cover directors 
of for-profit corporations could thus be seen as a natural extension of 
the attorney general’s existing powers. 
 Although the notion is contested, the public purpose of the business 
corporations has long been acknowledged.285 Most commentators accept 
that corporations and their officials bear some responsibility to 
promote the public interest. 286  Furthermore, the social impact of 
major corporate failures, plant shutdowns, and widespread layoffs 
has pushed legislatures and courts to acknowledge the public purpose 
of corporations. Thirty states have adopted so-called “other 
constituency” statutes acknowledging directors’ authority to consider 
the interests of employees, communities, and other stakeholders 
when making business decisions.287 Allowing state attorneys general 
to enforce the fiduciary duties of directors of business corporations 
would be consistent with this public conception of the corporation. 
 Objections to this proposal could emerge along at least two lines. On 
one hand, state attorneys general have not been particularly aggressive 
in enforcing duties of directors of charitable institutions.288 Although 
                                                                                                                      
 284. Id.; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 785–86 (noting that this 
supervision may not be enough to ensure that a trustee of a charitable organization 
does not breach a fiduciary duty).  
 285. For a classic account discussing directors’ fiduciary obligations to a 
corporation, see generally E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). See also A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 
A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (holding that corporations have the authority to reasonably 
contribute to charity). 
 286. COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, at 88–89; see PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b) (Revisions to the Proposed 
Final Draft 1992) (“Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby 
enhanced, the corporation in the conduct of its business (1) Is obliged to the same 
extent as a natural person to act within the boundaries set by law; (2) May take into 
account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the 
responsible conduct of business; and (3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources 
to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”). 
 287. JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 116–17 (5th 
ed. 2003). Delaware has not enacted an “other constituency” statute; however, its 
supreme court has acknowledged directors discretion to consider the interests of 
stakeholders when responding to hostile takeover attempts. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“[The defensive measure] entails an 
analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the 
corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price 
offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 
“constituencies” other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and 
perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality 
of securities being offered in the exchange.”). In a later decision the court qualified this 
statement by making clear that for the interests of other constituencies to be validly 
considered they must be “rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.” 
Revlon Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
 288. See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, 
Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 622–24 (1999) (describing the 
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attorneys general have intervened in instances of large-scale abuse, 
they generally lack both the resources and the motivation to 
vigorously enforce the duties of nonprofit corporation directors.289 
Such concerns may be muted with respect to business corporations, 
where citizens may be hungering for public enforcement action and 
thus more likely to provide political and budgetary support for 
enforcement of directors’ duties. 
 A contrasting objection to expanding attorneys general’s 
enforcement powers might stem from a lack of trust in the attorney 
general’s political motivations.290 In recent years, commentators have 
expressed concern with the “zealousness” of recent New York 
Attorneys General Eliot Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo, both of whom 
pursued Wall Street firms on fraud charges and then used the AG’s 
office as a stepping stone to the governor’s office. Of course, if an 
attorney general’s enforcement practices are popular enough that 
voters reward his enforcement efforts by electing him to higher office, 
it seems somewhat odd to criticize their efforts in that regard. 
b.  Judicial Remedies 
 If the attorney general’s office is deemed ill-equipped to take on 
the additional burden of enforcing directors’ duties, state judges could 
assume the mantle. For example, with little change to current 
practice, judges could impose director bars as a remedy in traditional 
shareholder litigation. Even when a court concludes there is 
insufficient evidence of bad faith to impose monetary liability for 
breach of duty, a court could issue an injunction against future 
director service upon a finding of inadequate oversight.291 After all, 
§ 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law proscribes only 
monetary damages for due care breaches, allowing for actions for 
injunctive relief based upon the gross negligence standard.292  
                                                                                                                      
challenges faced by attorney generals when enforcing the duties of charitable 
directors). 
 289. See Brody, supra note 283, at 939 (“[F]ew state attorneys general have the 
funding and inclination to engage in aggressive charity enforcement.”); Garry W. 
Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 
GA. L. REV. 1113, 1128 (2007) (explaining that lack of resources and low staffing levels 
contribute to criticisms of permissive oversight). 
 290. See Brody, supra note 283, at 946 (quipping that AG is known to stand for 
“aspiring governor”). 
 291. The SEC’s legislative authority to impose bars was granted in recognition 
of the courts’ use of injunctive powers to bar individuals from future violations of the 
securities law. See Carlson, supra note 267, at 682–84 (discussing the development of 
the SEC injunction and the five-factor test employed to determine likelihood of 
recurrence). 
 292. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). Delaware courts regularly 
consider actions for injunctive relief based on directors’ alleged breach of fiduciary duty 
in connection with proposed acquisitions. 
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 If an action for a judicial order banning future service were 
sanctioned by the states, lawyers would continue to bring cases 
alleging breach of the duty of care and would be entitled to attorneys’ 
fees in appropriate cases. For corporate jurisprudence to play a 
meaningful role in shaping corporate norms, as many commentators 
claim it does, there must be cases to adjudicate.293  However, the 
current doctrine provides little incentives for lawyers to file claims 
alleging a breach of oversight duties.294  
C. Federalism’s Conundrum 
 Expanding judicial remedies for oversight breaches might be the 
reform most faithful to existing federalism boundaries. However, 
states may be reluctant to pursue this remedy for fear of alienating 
managers and losing the corporate franchise. The nature of interstate 
competition for corporate charters thus makes it unlikely that states 
would embrace such a change.295 Whether one views the competition 
for corporate charters as creating a race to the top or a race to the 
bottom, most commentators agree that such competition inevitably leads 
to management-friendly policies.296 Because corporate managers have 
the power to select the state of incorporation, states can be expected 
to resist any reforms that threaten the comfort level of directors, 
absent the prospect of more onerous federal legislation along similar 
lines.297 
                                                                                                                      
 293. Miller, supra note 94, at 329. Professor Miller suggests another alternative 
to adjudicating oversight claims. He proposes that in certain circumstances judges 
conduct judicial inquiries into allegations of due care breaches upon the motion of an 
intervenor. Id. at 336. The purpose of the judicial inquiry would be to determine 
whether a breach occurred, not to determine liability. Id. at 338. Professor Miller 
argues that such inquiries would preserve a judicial role in establishing conduct 
standards for directors, which the courts’ current doctrines have essentially eliminated. 
Id. at 336–41. 
 294. Id. at 329 (stating that obstacles to success in derivative litigation mean 
few lawyers will bring due care cases).  
 295. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (envisioning the competition for corporate 
charters as a “race to the bottom”); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (discussing 
the interstate competition for corporate charters as “a race to the top”). 
 296. See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 63–65 (1976) 
(explaining that state chartering is a “revenue game between states” which has 
increased the American corporation’s power); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14–15 (Christopher C. DeMuth & Jonathan R. Macey eds., 
1993) (discussing the effect of corporate charter competition and identifying the 
common position that firm-demanded laws result); Winter, supra note 295, at 255 
(explaining that as state corporate law has developed, management now faces fewer 
restrictions).  
 297. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of 
Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 629 (2004) (urging sustained federal engagement 
on corporate governance issues as a check against Delaware’s tendency toward laxity).  
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 Thus, while states might be the most appropriate locus for the 
reforms advocated here, they are also the level of government least 
likely to adopt them. Ironically, then, the best way to prod states to 
consider the reforms discussed here would be to advocate for their 
adoption at the federal level, even though expanding federal 
regulation requires further trampling of closely held federalism 
ideals. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 This Article has proposed implementation of a public 
enforcement system for the fiduciary duties of directors of U.S. 
corporations. It reasons that a credible accountability mechanism is a 
necessary element of a regulatory regime that aims to promote 
optimal compliance levels. In the United States, private fiduciary 
duty litigation represents the principal mechanism for director 
accountability. However, due to doctrinal and procedural hurdles, 
such litigation fails to provide for real accountability. 
 In Australia, ASIC has the power to enforce directors’ statutory 
duties, including the duty of care. The public enforcement system 
exists alongside the private shareholder derivative lawsuit. 
Australia’s public enforcement system offers several advantages over 
the American approach. First, Australian law allows the regulator to 
undertake enforcement action when it is in the public interest to do 
so. Second, Australian law provides the regulator with a range of 
possible remedies when enforcing statutory duties, including 
disqualification orders and pecuniary penalties. Disqualification 
orders allow for the removal of incompetent directors, and pecuniary 
penalties allow for the imposition of penalties that are calibrated to 
the level of director culpability. Finally, the system of public 
enforcement overcomes many of the objections to private shareholder 
litigation in the United States, including fear of strike suits and 
disproportionate damage awards. 
 For these reasons, the public enforcement model deserves careful 
consideration in the United States. The imposition of civil penalties 
for fiduciary violations could serve as an important disciplinary 
function that is currently absent from the U.S. corporate law regime. 
Adopting such a model in the United States would not be easy. 
Obstacles to implementation include questions of federalism, the 
traditional conceptual divide between corporate and securities law in 
the United States, and the absence in the United States of a system 
for public enforcement of directors duties. Despite these conceptual 
barriers, it is time for U.S. policymakers to consider implementing a 
public enforcement system for directors’ fiduciary duties. 
